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LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS ARGUE
ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION
Jack M. Balkin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The quarrel between lawyers and historians about the proper
use of history in constitutional law is an old one. It predates the
rise of conservative originalism in the 1970s and 1980s. For
example, the term “law office history”—now regularly employed
to criticize lawyers who engage in historical arguments that are
opportunistic, anachronistic, and unsophisticated—was employed
by the legal historian Alfred Kelly in 1965.1
Kelly’s target was not today’s movement conservatives. He
criticized the Supreme Court’s practices throughout the
nineteenth century. 2 Kelly especially objected to the work of
liberal Justices in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, who, he argued, had
misused the history of the Founding to overturn older, politically
conservative precedents. 3 The Justices, Kelly complained, had
anachronistically invoked history “as a precedent-breaking

* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law
School. My thanks to Josh Blackman, Jonathan Gienapp, Mark Graber, Steve Griffin, Jill
Hasday, Sanford Levinson, Reva Siegel, Seth Barrett Tillman, and John Witt for their
comments on previous drafts.
1. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
119, 122, 122 n.13 (“By ‘law-office’ history, I mean the selection of data favorable to the
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper
evaluation of the relevance of the data proffered.”). Kelly was no stranger to the use of
history in constitutional argument; he had helped the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in
preparing its historical arguments in Brown v. Board of Education. But he worried that in
doing so he had become less of a historian and more of an advocate. RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 638–40 (1977).
Although the expression “law office history” is often associated with Kelly, he was not
the first to use it. See Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American
Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963) (associating the phrase with
Howard J. Graham).
2. Kelly, supra note 1, at 125–26.
3. Id. at 130–32.

345

BALKIN 35:3

346

12/29/2020 11:19 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.35:345

instrument, by which the Court could purport to return to the
aboriginal meaning of the Constitution. It was thus able to declare
that in breaking with precedent it was really maintaining
constitutional continuity.” 4 What historians object to today—
lawyers sanctimoniously using the authority of the Founding to
enact their contemporary policy preferences—was not a modern
innovation, Kelly explained. It had been the Supreme Court’s
standard operating procedure.
The quarrel, however, is not simply one between lawyers on
the one side, and historians on the other. Lawyers (including legal
academics) are often much more sharply critical of each other’s
historical arguments than are professional historians.5 Many law
professors have been trained as historians and some hold
doctorates in history. Perhaps more important, lawyers may be
especially sharply critical of how other lawyers use history
because they are trying to win arguments within law and legal
theory. (The often heated debates over the meaning of the Second
Amendment are a prime example.) 6 The adversary culture of
legal argument encourages portraying opposing arguments as
incomplete, mistaken, anachronistic, or wrong-headed. So
lawyers find themselves on all sides of debates about how lawyers
should (and should not) use history in constitutional
interpretation.
Even to speak of “lawyers” as a group neglects the fact that
there are many kinds of lawyers. Some are judges deciding cases.
Some are advocates before courts, legislatures, and administrative
4. Id. at 125.
5. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Can The Quill Be Mightier than the Uzi?: History
“Lite,” “Law Office,” and Worse Meets the Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 663,
665 (2015) (reviewing MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY
(2014)) (denouncing “the sorry tale of misuse and manipulations” of the history of the
Second Amendment by legal scholars); William G. Merkel, Heller As Hubris, and How
McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2010) (“My own objections to Justice Scalia’s work
product in Heller focus on the fact that his allegedly history-driven method depends
fundamentally on numerous false historical claims.”).
6. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 5; Paul Finkelman, The Living Constitution and the
Second Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and a Very Confused Court, 37
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2015) (“In both Heller and McDonald the Court bases its
conclusions on a false history that is, for the most part, a fantasy of the majority of the
Court and opponents of reasonable firearms regulation.”); Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356 (2009)
(arguing that Justice Scalia pronounced a wide range of gun control regulations
constitutional with no historical evidence or grounding in original meaning).

BALKIN 35:3

2020]

12/29/2020 11:19 PM

LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS

347

agencies. Some are legal academics writing learned studies that
argue for the best interpretation of constitutional provisions. And
some are legal academics who study history much as professional
historians do, focusing not on which interpretation of the law is
correct but on how law and society developed in the way they did.
The opposition between “lawyers” and “historians” runs
together two distinctions. The first opposition concerns
professional training and professional culture. Lawyers are
educated to be lawyers and have law degrees. They are trained in
an adversary culture and they are taught to assert and dispute
claims about legal authority, to enter into and win arguments
about what the law is or should be. They think about history and
use history in ways that reflect this adversarial culture of authority
claiming.7 Historians are trained differently. Their central task is
not winning legal arguments, or establishing or demolishing legal
authority. They are interested in the past for many reasons other
than present-day legal debates. 8 They are taught to relish and
respect ambiguity, the inevitability of multiple interpretations, the
complexity and multivocality of the past, the fact that the world
of the past was quite different from the world of the present, and
that that the concerns and understandings of people living in the
past were often very different from concerns and understandings
of people living in the present. 9 This first distinction—in
7. See Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past: The Use of History in Law, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 513–14 (2008) (noting the advantages of the the distinctively
adversarial culture of lawyers.); Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 387, 395, 402–05 (2003) (noting that law is an adversarial system that uses
history to claim authority); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193,
195 (1993) (arguing that law is governed by the “logic of authority” rather than the “logic
of evidence”) (quoting Frederic W. Maitland, Why the History of English Law Is Not
Written, in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 480, 491
(H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911)); id. at 195–96 (“In discovering the past, the historian weighs
every bit of evidence that comes to hand. The lawyer, by contrast, is after the single
authority that will settle the case at bar.”).
8. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 114–15 (1997) (distinguishing “lawyers’ legal
history” and “historians’ legal history.”) (quoting Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the
Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1578 (1987) and WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN
PHILLIP REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 185, 235–37, 261–87
(1985)).
9. BERNARD BAILYN, SOMETIMES AN ART: NINE ESSAYS ON HISTORY 22 (2015)
(“[T]he past is a different world.”); Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism: Failures
of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 942–43 (2015) (arguing that the
Founders’ world was different in its assumptions, in its conceptual structures, and in how
it used language, so that one cannot assume “that Founding-era utterances are fairly easy
to understand because they were spoken and written in English.”).
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professional training and professional culture—is neither clearcut nor universal, because many law professors (and some
practicing lawyers) have been trained as historians and hold
history PhD’s.
The second, and more important, distinction concerns
rhetorical aims and rhetorical structure. This is not a distinction
between those people who have law degrees, practice law, sit on
the bench, or teach in law schools, and those who don’t. It is a
distinction that concerns how one makes an argument and what
one is trying to achieve in making that argument. One the one side
are those I will call “legal advocates”—most but not all of whom
are trained as lawyers. This group includes judges, lawyers, and
citizens: anyone who wants to make—or wants to win—an
argument about the proper legal interpretation of the
Constitution. On the other side are those I will call “scholarhistorians”—who may include people in or out of the academy,
including the legal academy. This group includes those who study
history for reasons other than winning legal arguments or
establishing the correct interpretation of the law.
The difference between these groups does not consist in the
fact that one group makes arguments and the other doesn’t.
(Historians can be very argumentative when they want to be!)
The difference is not that one group just focuses on the facts and
the other has normative values. Historians’ work may be strongly
normative, in their interpretations, in the presuppositions they
bring to their work, in their choice of subject matter, or in all
three. And the difference is not that one group’s work is aimed at
influencing contemporary politics and public policy and the other
eschews any ambition for influence or consequences. Historians,
like legal advocates, may be very much in the world. Their
histories may reflect present-day concerns. Their choice of subject
matter, their treatment of that subject matter, and the conclusions
they draw may be designed to comment critically on the present.10
Rather, the key difference between the categories of lawyeradvocates and scholar-historians is that lawyer-advocates make
arguments that are legally prescriptive as well as normative. Their
work prescribes the correct interpretation of law. It asserts what

10. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, The Fight Over the 1619 Project Is Not About the Facts,
THE ATL. (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12/historiansclash-1619-project/604093/.
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the law is, or, when the law is unsettled, unclear, or in need of
reform, what the best interpretation of the law should be. This
way of arguing does not simply assert what is moral or immoral,
prudent or imprudent, true or false. Rather, it claims legal
authority, or it offers facts and arguments to support such claims
of authority.11
Lawyers learn to argue for and against legal interpretations,
to claim legal authority for their positions and to undermine the
claims of legal authority of those they disagree with. They try to
reduce uncertainty into certainty, and turn complication into
persuasive argument. Lawyers believe that their audiences want
clear cut answers, and so they provide them.
The tensions between the work of lawyer-advocates and
scholar-historians are at their greatest precisely when lawyeradvocates are most adversarial and most prescriptive, when they
are most determined to establish clear legal authority for their
arguments and undermine or explode the claims of authority
made by their opponents. 12 Historians have noted this tension
repeatedly when they write or join amicus briefs in high profile
cases, for example, concerning abortion and gun rights.13
In the legal academy, this assertion of legal authority may be
11. John Phillip Reid, supra note 7, at 196 (“The search for authority, the need to
find ‘the law’ or ‘the right law’ is the main reason lawyers speak of the legal past in terms
quite different from the historian’s.”).
12. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that the NAACP’s brief in Brown v. Board
of Education presented “a great deal of perfectly valid constitutional history,” but that “it
also manipulated history in the best tradition of American advocacy, carefully marshaling
every possible scrap of evidence in favor of the desired interpretation and just as carefully
doctoring all the evidence to the contrary, either by suppressing it when that seemed
plausible, or by distorting it when suppression was not possible”).
13. See Joshua Stein, Historians Before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of
Originalism, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 359, 362–80 (2013) (describing how historians had
to alter their practices in writing Supreme Court amicus briefs involving the Second
Amendment, gay rights, and detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
A famous example is the historians’ brief in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
492 U.S. 490 (1989), which spawned considerable reflection among legal historians. Brief
of 281 American Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, reprinted in 12 THE
PUBLIC HISTORIAN 37 (1990); see Wendy Chavkin, Webster, Health, and History, 12 PUB.
HISTORIAN 53 (1990); Estelle B. Freedman, Historical Interpretation and Legal Advocacy:
Rethinking the Webster Amicus Brief, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 27 (1990); Michael Grossberg,
The Webster Brief: History as Advocacy, or Would You Sign It?, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 45
(1990); Jane E. Larson & Clyde Spillenger, “That’s Not History”: The Boundaries of
Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 33 (1990); Sylvia A. Law, Conversations
Between Historians and the Constitution, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 11 (1990); James C. Mohr,
Historically Based Legal Briefs: Observations of a Participant in the Webster Process, 12
PUB. HISTORIAN 19 (1990).
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several steps removed. Legal academics may renounce any
interest in prescriptive arguments about legal authority. They may
insist that they are not telling courts how to decide cases. But if
courts are interested in a particular ground of decision—for
example, the original meaning of the Constitution—this, and not
that, is the correct answer to the question.14 In this way, a legal
academic, disclaiming all normative ambitions, may focus
intensively on uncovering the original meaning of a particular
constitutional provision, with the implication that if courts want
to be faithful to the original meaning, they should see it the same
way.
In the quest for authority, lawyers do not merely condense
and simplify. They also extend legal authority from the past. They
seek to infer, from an incomplete historical record reflecting a
different historical context, how the past would bear on presentday problems. They complete arguments that may have never
been completed; they draw inferences and apply insights that may
never have been drawn or applied by people living in the past.
This act of extension in pursuit of authority is always creative.15
Because they focus on cases, statutes, and other legal
materials, professionally trained lawyers may not pay very much
attention to what professionally trained historians think about the
topics on which they expound. As Michael Rappaport puts it
succinctly, “[T]he originalist is not looking for ‘what the past tells
us about a matter.’ The originalist is looking for the original
meaning.”16
14. See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1231 (2012)
(distinguishing between the task of ascertaining original meaning, theories of political
legitimacy, and theories of adjudication).
15. See also Kramer, supra note 7, at 402–08 (noting that lawyers have distinctive
ways of making arguments, using evidence, imposing burdens of proof, and resolving
uncertainties that are not shared in other disciplines). As Larry Kramer puts it:
[I]nsofar as the originalist interpretive method unavoidably involves a creative
act by the modern interpreter—that of completing an argument that may have
been unfinished when the Constitution was adopted—this link [between the
Founders and the present] is just as unavoidably broken. At that point, there is
literally no difference between what an originalist does and what is done by the
most anti-historicist non-originalist—except, of course, for the results (each
approach producing its share of outcomes that adherents of the other approach
view as bizarre, made up, and unjustifiable).
Id. at 407; see also id. at 412–13 (“Taking sides in an unresolved historical debate is no
different from taking sides in an unresolved contemporary one, and doing so severs the
link to what supposedly gives [an originalist] (or any) historical argument its normative
legal significance.”).
16. Mike Rappaport, An Important Difference Between Historians and Originalist
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But when historians do criticize them, lawyers may tend to
react defensively. In a blog post entitled “Challenging the
priesthood of professional historians,” 17 constitutional scholar
Randy Barnett argued that historians’ criticisms of originalism
were often misguided: “some [historians] apparently believe that
they, and they alone, can recover the meaning of a law enacted in
the Eighteenth Century when they would not be able to
understand the meaning of a law enacted in the Twenty-First.
That’s either hubris or chutzpah.” 18 Reviewing Jack Rakove’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning book Original Meanings, 19 Saikrishna
Prakash complained that “Rakove’s primary problem is that he
approaches the law as a historian. . . . Rakove recounts events in
the time-honored tradition of the historian less concerned about
the meaning of legal text and more concerned with ideas.” 20
Confronted by historians’ critiques, lawyers may argue that
historians do not understand what they are doing, and emphasize
that historians and lawyers are engaged in different projects.21
Lawyers attempt to escape the gaze and condemnation of
historians through two standard stories that explain the
differences between what lawyers and historians do. The first is
the story of legal science—by which I do not mean experimental
science but an organized body of thought and methods
characteristic of a learned profession. The second is the story of a
usable past. Each explanation seeks to turn the tables on
historians, arguing that they lack something necessary to interpret
Law Professors, LAW & LIBERTY (Oct. 11, 2018), https://old.lawliberty.org/2018/10/11/animportant-difference-between-historians-and-originalist-law-professors/.
17. Randy E. Barnett, Challenging the Priesthood of Professional Historians, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/28/challenging-the-priesthood-of-professional-historians/.
Barnett responded to a critique of originalism by Stanford historian Jonathan Gienapp.
Jonathan Gienapp, Constitutional Originalism and History, PROCESS: A BLOG FOR AM.
(Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.processhistory.org/originalism-history/ (“By
HIST.
understanding how [originalism] has changed, we can appreciate the unique, little
understood, and urgent threat it now poses to the practice of history.”).
18. Barnett, supra note 17.
19. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
20. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 529, 539 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 20, at 539–40 (arguing that historians do not
understand what originalist lawyers are doing); Barnett, supra note 17; Mike Rappaport,
Historians and Originalists, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2013/08/historians-andoriginalistsmike-rappaport.html (same).
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the Constitution correctly.
The first story portrays lawyers as experts in legal science—a
body of knowledge and a rigorous set of methods and practices
that is known and practiced only by professionally trained lawyers
with legal degrees. Historians are uneducated laypersons,
unskilled in the special techniques of legal reasoning—the
professional knowledge available only to the possessors of the JD
degree—and ignorant of the artificial reason of the law. “[S]ome
historians,” Randy Barnett explains, “seem to think they can
investigate the meaning of legal terms and concepts in the past
without any legal training. For this it helps to be a lawyer. True,
some of the best legal historians do have legal training, but not all
who opine on the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution do.”22
The second story portrays lawyers as practical people who
must solve contemporary problems of great importance. Because
of these worldly and professional obligations, lawyers need a
useable past. 23 “The search for a useable past,” Cass Sunstein
argues, “is a defining feature of the constitutional lawyer’s
approach to constitutional history.”24 Lawyers, Alexander Bickel
explained, “are guided in our search of the past by our own
aspirations and evolving principles, . . . principles that we can
adopt or adapt, or ideals and aspirations that speak with

22. Barnett, supra note 17; see also Rappaport, supra note 21 (arguing that
“[h]istorians often do not understand or apply [originalism] correctly,” because “historians
often lack legal training,” are “trained to be skeptical of reaching conclusions that suggest
a single (or dominant) view at a time,” and because “if one has the skills to be a historian,
he or she may not have other skills.”); cf. Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal
Scholarship: The Case Of History-In-Law, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 909, 917 (1996)
(explaining, with some degree of irony, that “the criteria for determining whether someone
has done well at the practice of history-in-law may be different from those for determining
whether someone has done well at the practice of history, and they may be developed and
applied by lawyers and legal academics rather than historians.”).
23. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1017,
1055 (1981) (“Many of the criticisms that historians make of lawyers’ history are indeed
irrelevant to the lawyer’s task. . . . [Sometimes] they want . . . to make new, mythic,
traditions out of it to use in current argument.”); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The
History Of Crisis—and the Crisis of History—in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV.
459, 504–07 (1997) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM (1996)) (noting the argument that lawyers are more interested in myth and
heritage than in historical niceties); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 601, 604 (1995) (arguing for “identify[ing] those features of the
constitutional past” that a lawyer views as “especially suitable for present constitutional
use”); Tushnet, supra note 22, at 924–28 (noting, without specifically endorsing, this
feature of history-in-law).
24. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603.
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contemporary relevance. . . .” 25 But historians, because of their
own professional norms and obligations, have a different
approach. So they fail to understand what lawyers need in order
to do their jobs; and this makes their criticisms unhelpful. In this
story, historians are antiquarians: academics ensconced in the
ivory towers of the humanities. Perversely, historians see it as
their mission to make the past alien, convoluted, complicated, and
of no practical use to anyone.26
These two rhetorical strategies push in opposite directions.
The story of lawyers as legal scientists portrays lawyers as
gatekeepers of an elite specialized knowledge misunderstood by
and inaccessible to the general public, while the story of the need
for a usable past portrays lawyers as practical problem solvers
who, unlike historians, are very much in the world. But what
unites the two stories is their emphasis on the distinctive
professional identity of lawyers. Because (non-JD) historians do
not face the professional imperatives of lawyers and lack their
professional training, historians’ objections are either naive or
misguided.
Both of these stories are misleading. First, they paint a false
picture of how the work of historians is relevant to legal argument.
Second, by emphasizing lawyers’ professional differences from
historians, they disguise disagreements within the class of lawyers
and legal advocates about how to use (and how not to use) history.
When lawyers try to stiff-arm historians, often what they are
actually doing is engaging in long-running disputes with other
lawyers who disagree with their interpretive theories, their
methods, and their conclusions.
We need a better account of the relationship between legal
25. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 109–10 (2d ed. 1986).
26. See Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L. REV.
37, 37 (1998) (“History, or at least history written according to the conventions of late
twentieth century professional historians, with an emphasis on the ways in which the past
differed from the present—history as an account of the pastness of the past, as the standard
expression goes—enormously complicates the task of legal argument.”); Gordon, supra
note 23, at 1055 (“[T]he immediate interest of historians is always in ‘historicizing’ the past
as much as possible, tamping it down firmly into departed times and places.”); Helen
Irving, Outsourcing The Law: History and the Disciplinary Limits of Constitutional
Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 961 (2015) (“The instrumental use of history is
entirely at odds with the skeptical discipline required of historians.”); Tushnet, supra note
22, at 915 (noting the familiar historical tropes of showing the complexity, contradiction,
foreignness, and strangeness of the past).
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argument and historical scholarship, an account that shows how
legal advocates and historians actually join issue in debates about
the Constitution.
Fortunately, there is a fairly straightforward way to explain
what is going on, and it uses a very familiar idea in constitutional
theory—the modalities of constitutional argument. The
modalities treat legal reasoning as rhetoric—as a set of common
topics for argument that shape and structure legal discourse and
legal imagination. 27 The modalities not only shape how an
argument is constructed; they also connect the advocate’s
reasoning to claims of legal authority as naturally as ligaments
connect muscle to bone.
Focusing on the modalities of constitutional argument helps
us understand how legal advocates use history in constitutional
argument. Modalities mediate and filter the past through
rhetorical forms. 28 Legal advocates don’t simply invoke history
when making their arguments. They channel history through the
standard topics of legal justification. 29 These forms of legal
justification—for example, appeals to text, structure, and
precedent—simultaneously explain why their positions claim
legal authority, and why other people (and especially judges)
should accept these arguments.30
The modalities are also the lenses through which lawyers see
and discover history. Legal advocates—and especially

27. See Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1881
(1994) (“[L]egal activity is . . . expressed and acted out through the various modalities of
legal argument. . . . [T]the modalities are the grammar of the law. . . .”); id. at 1891 (“[W]e
have the modalities we do because the Anglo-Americans took the forms of argument at
common law and superimposed these on the state when they imposed a written, limiting
constitution on the state.”).
28. Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional
Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 189 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Arguing About
the Constitution]; Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 664–65 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, The New Originalism].
29. The idea that argument is structured in rhetorical topics goes back to Aristotle.
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 44–46 (George A. Kennedy
trans., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC]; Jack M. Balkin, A Night in
the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW’S
STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996). The modalities are what Aristotle would have called “special topics” connected
to a particular discipline or science. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28,
at 170, 181–82.
30. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at 185; Balkin, The New
Originalism, supra note 28, at 664.
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professionally trained lawyers—view history through the lens of
shared forms of legal justification. And how legal advocates
search for, understand, and employ history is shaped, consciously
or unconsciously, by these same forms of justification.31
In short, if we want to understand the disputes between
lawyers and historians, or between legal advocates and scholarhistorians, there is no better place to look than the structure of
legal rhetoric, because the structure of legal rhetoric reflects the
structure of legal reasoning.
Once we examine the quarrel between lawyers and historians
through the lens of the modalities, many issues become clear—
why self-confident lawyers ignore historians or find them
irrelevant, why they nevertheless cannot escape the critical gaze
of historians, and why they cannot do without historians’ history,
however much they may abuse or mangle it.
Part II of this article explains how legal advocates use
standard forms of argument to think and talk about history. The
way they look at and use history depends on the modalities they
employ. Part III explains that in using the modalities, legal
advocates invoke history in four different registers: constructively
and deconstructively, obediently and critically. Part IV shows how
historians interact with these rhetorical structures. It argues that
with respect to most of them, historians are as well-equipped if
not better equipped than lawyers. The article then takes up the
two standard ways that lawyers try to hold off criticisms from
historians. Part V discusses the claim that lawyers have a special
professionalized knowledge unavailable to non-legally trained
historians. Part VI discusses the claim that lawyers need a useable
past. Part VII concludes by arguing that the model of multiple
modalities provides the best way to make the past useable,
because it acknowledges the many different uses of history.
II. THE MODALITIES AND HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
Lawyers use a standard set of forms of argument to analyze
constitutional problems and construct arguments about the best
interpretation of the Constitution. Philip Bobbitt famously called
these standard forms of argument “modalities,” 32 and his basic
31. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 668–72 (showing how a focus on
text, tradition, and precedent look at the same history in different ways).
32. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter
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account has become widely accepted in constitutional theory.
It turns out, however, that Bobbitt’s original list of standard
arguments is not very useful for thinking about how lawyers use
history in constitutional argument. First, he confusingly called one
of his modalities “historical” argument.33 That seemed to imply
that there was a single historical modality, and that all the other
kinds of arguments—from text, precedent, consequences,
structure, and national ethos—did not use history. (Bobbitt
himself did not believe this.) Second, even more confusingly,
Bobbitt identified “historical” arguments with arguments from
original intention.34 This seemed to imply that the only ways that
lawyers used history in constitutional law was by making
originalist arguments. It also seemed to suggest that all originalist
arguments were arguments from original intention, which has not
been true since at least the 1980s, when arguments from original
public meaning became the dominant approach.
Some time back, building on the work of Bobbitt and
Richard Fallon, I proposed a different list of standard
constitutional arguments, better calibrated to the kinds of
arguments that lawyers make, and better designed to explain the
uses of history in constitutional argument.35
Most arguments about the proper interpretation of
Constitution fall into the following basic categories:36
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE].
33. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 32, at 9; BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 13.
34. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 32, at 9 (defining “[h]istorical
arguments” as those which “depend on a determination of the original understanding of
the constitutional provision to be construed”); BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 13 (“A[] historical modality may be attributed to
constitutional arguments that claim that the framers and ratifiers [of a constitutional
provision] intended, or did not intend. . . .”); id. (“Historical, or ‘originalist’ approaches to
construing the text . . . are distinctive in their reference back to what a particular provision
is thought to have meant to its ratifiers.”). Similarly, Richard Fallon’s list of constitutional
arguments refers to “[a]rguments of historical intent,” which he identified with “the intent
of the framers.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244, 1254 (1987). Both Bobbitt
and Fallon wrote at a time when the focus of originalist theory was shifting from original
intention and understanding to original meaning.
35. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at 183–84; Balkin, The
New Originalism, supra note 28, at 660.
36. This list is taken from Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution, supra note 28, at
183–84; and Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 660.
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1. Arguments from text. These include arguments about definitions of the words and phrases in the text; arguments that compare and contrast different parts of the text; arguments that
compare the text with other texts; arguments that look to dictionaries and corpus linguistics; and arguments that employ traditional canons of statutory interpretation.
2. Arguments about constitutional structure. These are arguments
about how the constitutional system as a whole should operate
and how the various parts of the system should interact with
each other. These include arguments about the proper functioning of federalism, the separation of powers, democracy, and republican government.
3. Arguments from constitutional purpose. These are arguments
about the point or purpose of the Constitution. They include arguments about the purposes, intentions, and expectations of the
people who lived at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
and its subsequent amendments, as well as purposes attributed
to the Constitution over time.
4. Arguments from consequences. These are arguments about the
likely consequences of interpreting the Constitution in one way
rather than another. Arguments from consequences include arguments of institutional prudence: arguments that consider the
political and practical consequences of a proposed interpretation (or implementing doctrine), the likely responses of other
institutions or persons if the interpretation were accepted, and
how well or how badly other actors will be likely to administer
the interpretation in the future.
5. Arguments from judicial precedent. These are arguments based
on previous judicial decisions, whether from the United States
or from pre-1789 Great Britain. They include arguments about
what is holding and what is dicta, about what is controlling authority and what is merely persuasive authority. They include
familiar common law arguments for distinguishing cases, generalizing from cases, reasoning from case to case, and reasoning
by analogy. Arguments from precedent include arguments
based on the doctrinal categories and tests that previous precedents have generated. Hence, arguments from judicial precedent collectively form a very large family of topics and subtopics. They are probably the most common form of legal
arguments about the Constitution.
6. Arguments from political convention. These are arguments
about political conventions and settlements that arise within institutions or branches of government (for example, within the
Executive Branch); or among institutions or branches of
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government (for example, conventions that arise between the
Executive Branch and Congress).
7. Arguments from the people’s customs and lived experience.
These arguments consider the public’s customs, expectations,
and ways of life and whether a proposed interpretation of the
Constitution will conform to, vindicate, assist, defy, or disrupt
them.
8. Arguments from natural law or natural rights. These arguments
concern rights that governments exist to secure and protect
(natural rights); as well as arguments about what kinds of laws
are necessary to protect and promote human flourishing (natural law).
9. Arguments from national ethos. Arguments from ethos appeal
to the character of the nation and its institutions, and to important, widely shared and widely honored values of Americans
and American culture.
10. Arguments from political tradition. Arguments from political
tradition appeal to the traditions and traditional values of the
American people, to cultural memory, to the meaning of key
events in American political history (e.g., the Revolution, the
Civil War, the New Deal), and to the lessons we should draw
from those events. They often overlap with arguments about national ethos.
11. Arguments from honored authority. Arguments from honored
authority appeal to the values, beliefs, and examples of culture
heroes in American life. Examples of culture heroes include the
Founders as a group and key Founders like George Washington
and James Madison; or important historical figures like Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony, and Martin Luther King. They often overlap with arguments about national ethos and political tradition.

These categories are not exhaustive, but they cover most
examples. All of the categories overlap to some degree, but the
last three are very closely related, so I will sometimes refer to
them collectively as arguments from ethos, tradition, and honored
authority.
Looking at this list, we can immediately draw several
conclusions about the use of history in constitutional argument.
First, people use history to support arguments from each of
these modalities. Even arguments from judicial precedent often
look to history. 37 The application of doctrinal categories may
37.

For an excellent account of how lawyers use history in precedental argument, see
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require historical inquiries. For example, the test for a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause depends on
showing a history of previous discrimination.38 That means that
there is no single modality of “historical argument.” Rather
arguments using all of the modalities may invoke history to
support their claims.
Second, how one uses history will differ depending on the
modality of argument one uses. For example, textual arguments
might look to dictionaries and corpus linguistics because they
focus on the meaning of the words of the text; arguments from
precedent might look to English legal history because they look
for the history of legal understandings; arguments from custom
might look to social histories; arguments from consequences
might look to experiences in the American colonies, the states and
other countries because they want to know how different choices
produce different effects; arguments from honored authority
might look to George Washington’s behavior in his first
Administration, or Frederick Douglass’s views on public schools,
and so on. For each modality of constitutional argument, there
will be a different way to use history.
Third, the kind of history one looks for depends on the
relevant modality of argument. The kind of argument one is
making—about linguistic meaning, legal practices, social custom,
predictable consequences—may make different historical sources
relevant. But even the same historical sources and events might
be used differently depending on the modality. Thus, different
aspects of the history of Reconstruction might support arguments
from text, structure, consequences, political tradition, or honored
authority.
Fourth, what we call “originalist” arguments are only a small
proportion of the many different kinds of legal arguments that use
history. The modalities are not confined to adoption history. They
can look to the history of many different times and places.39 They
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753 (2015).
38. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion).
39. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 666–68 (giving the example of
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 641 (1952), which makes a structural argument about executive power by drawing
comparisons to pre-World War II France, Great Britain, and Germany).
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can range across the whole of human activity. They need not be
confined to the views of Founders or adopters. And they can focus
on people who were excluded from or ignored in constitutional
debates.40
Fifth, even if we restrict ourselves to originalist arguments or
arguments from adoption history, there is not a single kind of
originalist argument. Arguments that look to Founding-era
dictionaries and corpus linguistics use history differently than
arguments about constitutional structure taken from the state
ratification debates; arguments about political conventions taken
from Washington’s First Administration; and arguments about
the legal meaning of the Constitution drawn from the English Bill
of Rights or the relative powers of Parliament and the King
following the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Sixth, and conversely, not all arguments about adoption
history count as originalist. Consider arguments for departing
from original legal understandings because those understandings
bear the taint of racism or sexism. These arguments use adoption
history, but not in the way that originalist legal scholars generally
do. (I return to this point when I discuss the distinction between
obedient and critical uses of history.)
Seventh, and finally, modalities of legal argument are
centrally about how to claim legal authority. Each modality offers
a different way to claim authority for a proposed legal
interpretation. That is because each modality rests upon
commonplaces about how to interpret the Constitution. Each
offers an implicit theory for why arguments of a certain kind
should be accepted as valid or as persuasive when people interpret
the Constitution, and why such arguments further the
Constitution and are faithful to the Constitution. When people
use history to make arguments from each modality, they are using
history to claim legal authority. They assert that the facts of
history have consequences for whose interpretation has legal
40. ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH, WOMEN AND POLITICS
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2007); Christina Mulligan, Diverse Originalism, 21
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 379 (2018); Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the
Democratic Reconstruction of the Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450 (2020),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Siegel_TheNineteenthAmendmentandtheDemocrati
zationoftheFamily_kwjdphtp.pdf; see also GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE
PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S at 60–71 (2019) (discussing the views of “constitutional
outsiders”).
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authority and whose does not. This is what makes legal uses of
history distinctive.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE AND DECONSTRUCTIVE,
OBEDIENT AND CRITICAL USES OF HISTORY
The culture of legal argument is an adversarial culture. Legal
advocates try to establish their own claims of legal authority, and
they also try to undermine claims of legal authority by their
opponents. This suggests two different rhetorical postures—one
that promotes certainty and one that promotes uncertainty.
Authority-constructing uses of history employ history to construct
claims of legal authority using the various modalities. They
marshal historical facts and organize historical studies to build a
convincing case and ward off potential objections. Authoritydeconstructing uses of history use history to rebut, cast doubt on,
or complicate other people’s uses of history as they employ the
modalities. The goal of authority-deconstructing arguments are
not to build up, but to tear down—to shift burdens of proof, to
sow uncertainty, to deny clarity, to multiply complexity, and to
assert that one’s opponent’s arguments gloss over important facts,
indulge in anachronisms, or are overly simplistic.
In addition, when advocates use the modalities, there are two
different ways to invoke the past as authority for law. The first
approach treats the past as a positive source of authority, as
something we should follow in the present. The second treats the
past as something we should avoid or transcend, or whose
unfortunate legacy we still suffer from.41

41. See ROBERT W. GORDON, The Past as Authority and Social Critic: Stabilizing and
Destabilizing Functions of History in Legal Argument, in TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON
LAW IN HISTORY AND HISTORY IN LAW 282–316 (2017) (describing lawyers’ opposing
uses of history); Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 123,
125 (1996) (“The critical modes [of historical argument] are used to destroy, or anyway to
question, the authority of the past.”); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-viewing
History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE
L.J. 237, 238 (1998) (“Abandoned past practices can be used to argue, through a process
of negative inference, against analogous modern practices. Equally important, negative
precedent acknowledges the injuries caused by past practices that now seem
unacceptable.”); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism:
The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 296, 300 (2003) (“Aversive constitutionalism . . . is backward-looking,
proceeding from a critique of where past (or other) institutions and principles went badly
wrong and taking such critiques as the negative building blocks of a new constitutional
order.”).
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Obedient uses of history treat the past as a positive model for
present-day behavior, because it reveals correct meanings,
because it serves as honored precedent, because it is morally
worthy, because it offers a positive example of what to do, because
it tutors us how to behave, or because it is consistent with political
traditions. Critical uses of history treat the past as something that
we should not follow in the present and should reject, compensate
for, or disown. Critical history is aversive history. It describes
faults, sins, and errors. It shows us what we should never let
happen again, what should no longer be part of us, and what we
should strive to repair. Critical history may also show us the legacy
of mistake, injustice, and oppression that we should react against,
that we should try to extirpate, compensate for, eliminate, or
disestablish in our current practices.
Of course, the past is neither uniformly one thing or another.
Good and bad, honorable and dishonorable, helpful and harmful,
are all mixed together, and what we see in the past reflects our
current situation and perspectives. The meaning of the past
continually changes, not because the facts change, but because we
change, pushed forward continuously into new situations, which
form ever new perspectives and points of comparison with the old,
and which cast a continuously changing light and shadow on what
went before. Historical studies rightly emphasize the motley
nature of the past, its richness and its ambiguity, as well as its
difference from our current world. In distinguishing between
obedient and critical uses of history, I am not claiming that the
moral meaning of history is clear-cut. Instead, I am interested in
how the past is used in legal rhetoric, as a positive model or a
negative precedent.
Combining these rhetorical postures, we have a box of four:
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TABLE 1: RHETORICAL POSTURES IN USING HISTORY

Obedient

Critical

Authority-constructing
(using the modalities)

Authority-deconstructing
(directed against opponents’
use of the modalities)

Claiming legal
authority from positive
example or precedent

Undermining claims to legal
authority from positive
example or precedent

Example: “Alexander
Hamilton’s views in
The Federalist are a
sure guide to the
powers of the
Presidency today.”

Example: “There is
insufficient evidence that
the Founding generation
believed that the Second
Amendment guaranteed an
individual right to bear arms
outside of military service.”
Undermining claims to legal
authority that draw use
aversive history or negative
examples

Claiming legal
authority through
aversive history or by
negative example
Example: “Today’s
voter identification
laws are a continuation
of the legacy of Jim
Crow-era poll taxes.”

Example: “It is a gross
oversimplification to
conclude that state bans on
government aid to religion
stem from anti-Catholic
bigotry.”

In practice, a skillful advocate will use all four of these
approaches in framing a legal argument, offering positive
precedents to be followed and negative historical examples to
disown, while simultaneously highlighting mistakes, confusions,
complexities, and anachronisms in opponents’ arguments.
Advocates will pick the part of the past they want to honor, while
disclaiming or glossing over other parts of the past. Their
opponents, eager to rebut them, will try to flip the script, seizing
on omissions and complications.
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IV. HISTORIANS MEET THE MODALITIES
How do scholar-historians fit into the rhetorical structures
I’ve just described? This assumes, of course, that they want to
participate. They might resist being drawn into forms of rhetoric
at cross-purposes with their scholarly enterprise. 42 But many
historians now author amicus briefs, 43 and serve as expert
witnesses in constitutional controversies. 44 So we can ask how
they might intervene in lawyers’ forms of argument.
First, historians can use the standard forms of constitutional
argument just as well as lawyers can. They can also make
arguments from text, structure, purpose, consequences, custom,
convention, tradition, ethos, honored authority, and so on. Most
of the standard modalities of constitutional argument do not
require any special professional training. A central motivation
behind Bobbitt’s original model of modalities, after all, was that
lawyers and ordinary citizens alike could practice constitutional
interpretation.45 The modality of argument that seems to benefit
most from specialized legal training is precedental argument: the
ability to employ and manipulate legal precedents—for example,
creating narrow and broad versions, distinguishing and
connecting bodies of case law, and developing new doctrinal
42. See Stein, supra note 13, at 362–70 (describing how historians had to alter their
practices in writing Supreme Court amicus briefs involving the Second Amendment);
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Linda Gordon & Kenneth Mack, Historians in Court: A
Roundtable, OAH, https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2017/november/historians-in-court-aroundtable/ (discussing the differences between legal advocacy and historical inquiry); see
also sources cited supra note 13 (discussing the choices historians had to make in the
Webster amicus brief to explain to courts why Roe v. Wade was correctly decided).
43. See, e.g., Nell Gluckman, Why More Historians Are Embracing the Amicus Brief,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (May 3, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/why-morehistorians-are-embracing-the-amicus-brief/ (“Historians say they feel that they are being
asked to write or sign amicus briefs in Supreme Court cases more frequently.”); Michael
Grossberg, Friends of the Court: A New Role For Historians, PERSPS. ON HIST. (Nov. 1,
2010),
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history
/november-2010/friends-of-the-court-a-new-role-for-historians (“[H]istorians are carving
out a crucial new role for themselves as direct contributors to debates about contested
legal issues such as same-sex marriage.”).
44. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Martin, Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert
Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1519 (2003) (“Historians
are increasingly being called to testify as expert witnesses. They appear in cases
adjudicating a vast array of matters. . . .”); Kritika Agarwal, Historians as Expert Witnesses,
PERSPS. ON HIST. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories
/perspectives-on-history/february-2017/historians-as-expert-witnesses-can-scholars-helpsave-the-voting-rights-act (“Historians’ testimony has had significant impact in voting
rights cases.”).
45. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 32, at 28–30.
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distinctions.46 The ability to cite and employ canons of statutory
construction might be a second, related skill. However, the
majority of historical inquiry in law does not depend on these
special skills. (And, of course, historians who are also lawyers
have received this training.)
Second, with respect to some of the modalities of legal
argument—arguments from custom, tradition, ethos, and
honored authority, or arguments from consequences that depend
on historical evidence and historical examples—we might expect
that historians would be better than non-historian lawyers in using
and deploying historical sources. That is especially the case for
those periods of history and those parts of the world with which
most lawyers are unfamiliar. But it is equally true of periods of
intense lawyerly concern, such as the history of Great Britain in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Founding, the Civil
War and Reconstruction. Historians may also be far more
competent at the history of political and social movements (both
successful and unsuccessful) that have shaped the American
political tradition.
Third, as noted above, lawyers use history both to construct
authority and to undermine and poke holes in other lawyers’ uses
of history. They use history both constructively and
deconstructively. Historians can certainly marshal the kinds of
evidence needed to support the standard forms of legal argument,
perhaps better than many lawyers can. But historians can also
offer the kinds of counter-evidence, counter-narratives, and
complications that are useful in rebutting these arguments. In fact,
historians are likely to be even better at these tasks than most
lawyers. 47 After all, historians are professionally rewarded for
discovering new forms of counter-evidence, offering interesting
counter-narratives, and noting historical complications. They are
rewarded for undermining previous historians’ takes and
producing ever new perspectives on the past.
Fourth, in constitutional law, lawyers not only disagree about
46. See Annette Gordon-Reed, Uncovering the Past: Lessons from Doing Legal
History, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 855, 858–59 (2006–07) (arguing that lawyers are often
better equipped than non-legally trained historians to think imaginatively about how
historical figures would handle hypothetical problems given the legal materials of their
day).
47. See Stein, supra note 13, at 380 (“Historians can make their advocacy more
effective—and more in line with their professional methodology—by using alternative
(rather than definitive) versions of the past to destabilize originalist argumentation.”).
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history; they also disagree about theories of legal interpretation—
including the many varieties of originalism. Legal dispute occurs
both at the level of historical inquiry and at the level of the
interpretive theories that connect history to legal norms. Lawyers
are hardly agreed on a single set of interpretive theories, and
judges may switch their theoretical assumptions from case to case.
Because lawyers disagree about theory as much as about
history, historians might play yet another role in legal disputes.
They can offer examples from history (and from historiography)
to critique the plausibility or practicality of some of these
interpretive theories. They can explain why certain kinds of
interpretive theories are anachronistic, or unlikely to be
successful on their own terms. 48 They can offer reasons and
evidence to show why certain theories of legal interpretation ask
questions of history that the historical record cannot reliably
answer. 49 They can show that certain historical sources that
lawyers rely on have a different meaning or importance than
lawyers think they do, or are not as reliable as lawyers imagine
them to be.50 Here again, historians are as likely to be as good as
(or better than) lawyers at this particular critical task.
Posing the issues in this way has a certain partiality: It asks
whether historians can play effectively on lawyers’ turf. Historians
might well wonder why this is the proper inquiry. After all, the
48. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 721, 724, 734–38 (2013) (criticizing original public meaning originalism for
abstracting away from the complexities of language during the Founding era and
projecting contemporary understandings onto the past in the form of an imagined
reasonable person); Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past: More Qualms About Public
Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 975 (2015) (criticizing original public
meaning originalism for neglecting “the linguistic ideas that were dominant in eighteenthcentury America”).
49. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 1, at 156–57 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s inquiry
into history in the Establishment Clause “asks questions of the past that the past cannot
answer”); Reid, supra note 7, at 202 (noting that “judges often read the records of the past
as if they were prepared similarly to the legislative history of today’s congresses, by
professional staffs anticipating issues likely to arise in litigation . . . [and] ask the past to
answer questions about matters that were not thought of at the time”).
50. See, e.g., MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015) (showing how James Madison revised his notes of
the Constitutional Convention over many years, often for political reasons); Saul Cornell,
Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 632–36 (2008) (arguing that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller
misunderstood how preambles were used at the Founding and failed to cite any Foundingera sources for his claims).
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door between the two professions swings both ways. Certainly one
could ask with equal merit whether lawyers can do the kind of
archival research, ask the kinds of research questions, and offer
the kinds of answers and analyses that professional historians
would regard as competent. 51 Indeed, lawyers, who are often
dogged investigators of facts, may be able to shed light on the
historical record and correct the views of historians.52 Nothing in
what I say here denies the importance of these questions—or for
that matter, the equal status and equal worth of the professional
perspectives of lawyers and historians. But the focus of this article
is the uses of history in constitutional interpretation and
constitutional argument. That interpretation and those arguments
are structured in the special topics of constitutional law.
Therefore I ask whether there is something special about the
modalities of legal argument that justifies lawyers discounting the
contributions of historians. The answer is no.
Viewed from the perspective of the modalities, it is easy to
understand how historians join issue with lawyers on the legal
interpretation of the Constitution. Professional differences aside,
the topics of legal argument are common topics for all—not just
lawyers and judges—that facilitate a common conversation.

51. Kramer, supra note 7, at 389–94 (pointing out the effort required to become even
minimally competent in understanding the thought of a given historical period).
52. For example, in litigation over the Foreign Emoluments Clause, Seth Barrett
Tillman was able to show that a key document listing the officers under the United States
(but not including the President) had been prepared and signed by Alexander Hamilton
in 1793. He also showed that another document said to contradict this account was not
signed by Hamilton and was actually a copy prepared many years later. See Adam Liptak,
‘Lonely Scholar with Unusual Ideas’ Defends Trump, Igniting Legal Storm, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-emolumentsclause-alexander-hamilton.html. The legal historians who accused Tillman of failing to cite
the second document subsequently agreed with him and apologized. Id.
Perhaps the most famous example of lawyers correcting the work of legal historians
is James Lindgren’s efforts in exposing the errors and falsehoods in the work of historian
Michael Bellesiles. See James Lindgren, Fall from Grace: Arming America and the
Bellesiles Scandal, 111 YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (book review). Bellesiles had won the
prestigious Brancroft Prize for his 2000 book ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE (2000), which argued that, at the time of the Founding, most
Americans did not own guns. Following the work of Lindgren, amateur historian Clayton
Cramer, and other scholars and historians, Columbia University revoked the prize. Robert
F. Worth, Prize for Book Is Taken Back from Historian, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/14/business/prize-for-book-is-taken-back-fromhistorian.html.
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V. THE SPECIAL SKILL AND
KNOWLEDGE OF LAWYERS
Perhaps the most common way that lawyers try to deflect
criticism from historians is to assert that historians are ignorant of
the specialized craft of lawyerly reasoning. Professionally trained
lawyers possess special techniques—known only to the
professionally educated and accredited—that allow them to
discern the legal meaning and the legal consequences of texts.
Because non-legally trained historians do not understand these
techniques, their criticisms of lawyers’ use of history are likely to
miss the mark. In our day, this kind of complaint is most likely to
come from conservative originalists, who often find themselves
beset by historians who claim that originalist uses of history are
narrow, parochial and anachronistic.
Michael Rappaport offers a good example of this strategy.
He argues that historians do not understand “the enterprise of
interpretation as practiced by originalists.” 53 “[T]he original
public meaning approach asks what the meaning of a provision
would have been to a reasonable and knowledgeable person at
the time. Historians often do not understand or apply this
correctly.”54 Because of this misunderstanding, “they often make
statements that originalists would strongly disagree with, without
any strong reasons backing them up—statements such as, because
there was disagreement at the time of the Constitution on a
provision, that means there was no original meaning.”55 Because
historians do not accede to or correctly apply originalist theories
of interpretation, their historical objections are irrelevant.
Rappaport has dubbed these irrelevant objections “history office
law,” a play on “law office history.”56
53. Rappaport, supra note 21.
54. Id.; see also Prakash, supra note 20, at 539–40 (“Rakove’s primary problem is that
he approaches the law as a historian. Although Rakove appears to understand that what
matters is the original meaning of legal text, his historian’s bent predominates. Rakove
recounts events in the time-honored tradition of the historian less concerned about the
meaning of legal text and more concerned with ideas.”).
55. Rappaport, supra note 21; see Prakash, supra note 20, at 535 (“Originalism simply
does not rest on a theory of definite meanings; it only requires an ability to determine
which of several possible meanings better reflects the most natural reading of the word or
phrase when the text was ratified.”).
56. Rappaport, supra note 21; see Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No
Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1551, 1559 (2012) (“‘[H]istory department law’ is a much greater threat to sound
constitutional interpretation than is ‘law office history.’”); Prakash, supra note 20, at 534,
541 (criticizing “history department law”).
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What Rappaport sees as misunderstanding or an inability to
use legal sources properly, however could equally be described as
a theoretical disagreement about the best way to interpret the
Constitution. Rappaport’s objection does not actually turn on
whether historians possess or lack legal training. Rather, his
argument depends on the assumption that historians should
accept his theory of the Constitution’s “original public meaning.”
“Original public meaning” is a theoretical construction, a
mediated account of the past that serves the purposes of law and
legal theory. This theory of interpretation selects certain features
of the past as relevant to legal inquiry, and discards the rest. It
takes those features of the past that it deems relevant and
reconfigures them for purposes of a particular theory of law.
Then, having selected and reconfigured the past, it dubs the result
the “original public meaning” and declares it binding on
everyone.57
Lawyers—including originalist lawyers—do not assume that
the past comes to us in the form of unambiguous and easily
intelligible commands; often it does not. Rather, originalist theory
treats the past as it does because of its theoretical commitments
and the practical needs of the present.58 History looks the way it
does to originalist theory because of what originalism needs the
past to be in order for it to serve the requirements of present-day
law.59 Originalism seeks to obey the past, but it can only do so if it
reconfigures the past so that it can be followed. Originalism is a
servant that needs a particular kind of master, and therefore goes
about constructing one. The past that emerges from originalist
inquiry is not simply a description of past events. It is an
understanding refracted through theoretical choices, some of
which may be plausible to other lawyers, and some of which may
57. I explain these claims more fully in Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original
Public Meaning, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 71 (2016).
58. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 7, at 405 (“Legal interpretation is fundamentally
about resolving ambiguities and uncertainties in language: about determining and bringing
to closure that which is undetermined and open.”); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules For
Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987) (“The originalist’s use of history is goaldirected: he wants to understand past thought and action in order to address present
concerns.”); Prakash, supra note 20, at 535 (arguing that the point of originalist
methodology is to do the best we can in order to solve current legal problems).
59. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 56, at 1554 (arguing that an originalism “in which
meaning is determined by the hypothetical understandings of a fictitious reasonable
observer, rather than those of any concrete historical figures” can solve practical problems
of adjudication).
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be highly controversial.
Originalist theories are hardly unique in this respect. Rather,
they exemplify how law and legal theory usually employ history.
They do not simply report what happened at a special moment in
time. Rather, they construct events—drawing together
occurrences in disparate locations, and collapsing and telescoping
time frames—to draw conclusions about meanings and purposes.
The “Founding,” for example, is not a magical moment in time. It
occurs in many different places, over several decades. But
originalist theories tend to treat the Founding as a unified event
producing meanings that are intelligible and tractable.
Originalist theories select elements from the historical
record, leaving much of the messy details of history on the cutting
room floor. They reorganize and reconfigure the record of the
past to produce the kind of knowledge that might be useful to the
legal enterprise. They make the past useful to lawyers so that
lawyers can employ it for present-day purposes. They beat the
past into a shape that can serve present-day objects.60
Once again, we should not see this as a particular problem of
originalism. All legal theories reconfigure history to theory in
varying degrees. All legal theories beat the past into shape, they
simply do it in different ways and for different ends. Theoretical
commitments tell lawyers what facts are relevant and important
and why they are relevant and important. These commitments
shape what lawyers look for in the past and what they find there;
what they obsessively focus on and what they casually discard.
A theory of original public meaning—and there are several
competing accounts—carefully constructs the past so that it can
serve the needs and values of the present. However, there is
nothing wrong with this as long as (1) people are candid about the
nature of the enterprise; (2) they do not pretend that they are
simply reporting facts free from theoretical framing and
reconfiguration; and (3) they are candid about the values that
their interpretive theory serves and are willing to defend those
values openly.

60. For a forthright defense of the practice, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 80 (2006) (“Lawyers create
the object of interpretation, so it is not surprising that lawyers might play a key role in
understanding it.”); see also Kramer, supra note 7, at 407 (pointing out that both
originalists and non-originalists are engaged in creative extensions of historical materials).
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Thus, the dispute is not over whether historians understand
or misunderstand constitutional interpretation or constitutional
law. Rather, it is a dispute is over whether a particular theoretical
construction—offered by a lawyer, judge or legal scholar—is a
good way to approach constitutional interpretation, or whether it
is too artificial, too limited, or too blinkered.
Most historians probably don’t accept Rappaport’s views
about the best way to interpret the Constitution. But most welltrained lawyers in the United States probably don’t accept this
theory either. Not all lawyers are originalists, and even among
originalists, there are important theoretical disagreements about
what original meaning is, how it is best demonstrated, and what
legal force it should have.61 Lawyers might make some of the same
objections that historians would. That is hardly surprising; lawyers
on either side of a controversy reach out for support from other
disciplines all the time.
In short, the problem is not that historians do not understand
the enterprise of originalist interpretation. It is that they do not
agree with the underlying theory, and many other lawyers would
agree with them. 62 Instead of a dispute between untutored
historians and knowledgeable lawyers, we also have an intermural
scrum among lawyers. Instead of a dispute between “law” and
“history,” we actually have a dispute within legal theory itself. It
is a dispute over how law should select from, filter, and
reconfigure the past so that law can use it for legal purposes.63
With respect to that task, historians have something to say, not
because they are experts in legal theory, but because they know
61. For examples of criticisms of Rappaport’s theory from non-originalists, see
Frederic Bloom & Nelson Tebbe, Countersupermajoritarianism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 809
(2015); John W. Compton, What Is Originalism Good For?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 427 (2015);
Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or
Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283 (2014); James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the
Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 515 (2014); Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive
Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459 (2016). For examples of criticisms from originalists, see Kurt
T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149 (2015); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 503–11
(2013).
62. The number of critiques of originalism by lawyers and law professors is seemingly
endless. For a recent example of the genre, see ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH
(2018).
63. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 503 (“The use of history in law, after all, is at
bottom a question of legal theory, and just as this method of constitutional interpretation
(originalism) is demonstrably flawed as a matter of practice, so it may also be a weak
candidate as a matter of theory.”).
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something about what kinds of theoretical projects the historical
record can plausibly support.
If lawyers would disagree with Rappaport about these
matters, it is not clear that similar objections by historians may be
dismissed as irrelevant. Put another way, it does not matter who
raises the objection, as long as the objection is an appropriate one
in the context of the forms of legal argument.64
To be sure, given their professional outlook and training,
historians may have particular reasons for objecting to a given
theory of original meaning. Jack Rakove, for example, has
strongly criticized the notion that we should equate original
meaning with the hypothetical reasonable and informed person at
the time of adoption. He points out that this is simply not a
credible way to do history.65 Inquiries into original meaning, he
believes, should be based on sound practices of historical
research, otherwise the account of original public meaning will be
anachronistic, and “nothing more nor less than a creature of the
modern originalist jurist’s imagination.”66
Rakove’s objections, however informed by his professional
training, would also be perfectly sensible for any lawyer to make
in rebutting arguments from text, structure, or purpose. 67 It is
always appropriate to point out that one’s opponent employs an
implausible methodology, that her arguments misuse historical
sources, that her theory of original meaning is question begging,
or that her inferences about historical meaning are naive or
anachronistic. It should not matter that these objections come
from the mouth of a professionally trained historian, who, if
anything, has even greater credibility in making them.

64. Consider, for an example, the argument that we cannot ground originalism on
original legal methods because there was no agreement about how to interpret the
Constitution at the time of the Founding. This argument has been made both by a
historian, Saul Cornell, and by law professors Larry Kramer and Caleb Nelson. See Saul
Cornell, Reading the Constitution, 1787–91: History, Originalism, and Constitutional
Meaning, 37 L. & HIST. REV. 821, 835–40 (2019); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems
with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912–13 (2008); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56, 561, 571–73
(2003).
65. Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 585–88 (2011).
66. Id. at 586.
67. Not surprisingly, non-originalist law professors have also attacked this approach
to originalism. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 61; Kitrosser, supra note 61; John T. Valauri,
Originalism and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 773 (2013).
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Rappaport might respond that lawyers who do not agree with
his theory of original public meaning are also wrong. They have
the wrong theory of interpretation, and therefore their historical
objections are equally irrelevant. But this means that his
complaint is not really that historians lack some skill that lawyers
possess, or that historians cannot grasp the special forms of
reasoning of professionally trained lawyers. Rather, his objection
is that other people—including both professionally trained
lawyers and historians—don’t share his particular theory.
Agreeing with a particular jurisprudential theory is not the same
thing as possessing lawyerly skill.
Randy Barnett has pointed out that if one adopts the New
Originalism, much history is not especially necessary or even
helpful to the task of interpretation. 68 That is because New
Originalists are mostly concerned with the definitions of words
and phrases, along with their use in legal context. “The fact that a
legal text is old sometimes makes the identification of meaning
more difficult, but far from impossible in most cases. For one
thing, the meaning of language hasn’t changed that much.” 69
Historians, Barnett suggests, are interested in “describing past
events, . . . explaining why what happened in the past happened,
[and] why people did what they did; as a result, they are very
concerned with identifying motives, or other causal influences.”70
These skills, he contends, are not particularly helpful in
ascertaining the objective meaning of legal terms.71
Barnett’s argument somewhat overstates the case. Historians
are not simply or exclusively interested in motives and causal
influences. They too, care a great deal about how people used
words and what they meant by them.72 More to the point, they are
interested in how people used words as rhetorical weapons, and
68. Randy Barnett, Can Lawyers Ascertain the Original Meaning of the Constitution?,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 19, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/08/19/canlawyers-ascertain-the-original-meaning-of-the-constitution/.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269,
292–93 (2017) (noting that historians are interested in questions of motive, purpose, and
causation, the development of ideas over time, and the discovery of archival material,
which may not be relevant to the discovery of original public meaning).
72. E.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism as Thin Description: An Interdisciplinary Critique,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2015); Cornell, supra note 64; Jonathan Gienapp,
Historicism and Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935
(2015); Rakove, supra note 48; Rakove, supra note 65.
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how different political, religious, or social groups used the same
words in slightly different ways. Historians are interested in the
rough and tumble of rhetorical combat. They are interested in the
refusal of particular combatants to employ key words and ideas in
the same ways as their opponents. (Something, which, I should
point out, happens even today.)
Moreover historians, like lawyers, may be interested in how
people deliberately used vague and equivocal language to win
others over or deflect uncomfortable difficulties in their political
positions. Historians care about such things because they
recognize that the exercise of language and the exercise of social
and cultural power are not fully distinct enterprises. The most
important words and phrases of a particular time may have been
a terrain of political combat in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, just as they are today. People wielded language as a
weapon in politics then just as they do now.
***
In sum, both historians and lawyers may think that language
works somewhat differently than Barnett describes. Therefore,
they may disagree with his assumption that it is fairly easy to pin
down a univocal original public meaning as to highly contested
terms such as “executive power,” “arms” or “commerce.” Once
again, this is not a dispute that can be resolved simply by
noting that one is a lawyer and pointing to one’s superior legal
expertise. Rather, it is a dispute about theories—and practices—
of interpretation to which many kinds of scholars might
contribute.
In any case, even if we accept Barnett’s central point—
that much history is not needed to understand the standard
meanings of words in common use—it only goes to the question
of interpretation. It says nothing about construction.
One consequence of the New Originalism’s theory of original
meaning is that many contested questions cannot be resolved
solely
through
ascertaining
original
meaning
(in
New Originalism’s sense of that word). Instead, people must
resolve these controversies through constitutional construction.73

73. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28; Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 70 (2011); Solum, supra note 61.
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Constitutional construction, in turn, requires us to use the eleven
modalities of constitutional construction described in this article.
When we turn to those modalities, wide swaths of history—and of
the work of historians—are relevant and important.74
William Baude and Stephen Sachs offer an ingenious way to
sidestep this problem. They argue that law avoids most of the
complications and uncertainties that professional historians find
in the past because law uses history in only limited ways. The task
of lawyers is to follow the law of the past, which continues as law
until it is (lawfully) changed.75 Deciding what the law of the past
is draws on lawyers’ legal training. Although “lawyers must often
defer to historical expertise on the relevant questions,”76 Baude
and Sachs explain, those relevant questions are greatly
circumscribed, so that “the legal inquiry is a refined subset of the
historical inquiry.”77 In particular, law “looks to legal doctrines
and instruments specifically, rather than to intellectual
movements more generally.” 78 The law “interprets these
instruments in artificial ways, properly ignoring certain facts
about their historical authors and audience. And when there is
uncertainty, it also applies various evidentiary principles and
default rules that can give us confidence about today’s law, even
when yesterday’s history remains obscure.”79
Because the focus of law is the application of old doctrines
and old statutes, rather than the entire corpus of historical
knowledge and intellectual history, the problem of applying old
law in new factual settings is greatly reduced. Ordinary legal
reasoning already involves the application of “old law to new
facts.” 80 This means that “originalism demands no more than

74. Balkin, supra note 57, at 91–96 (describing the different ways one uses history in
interpretation and construction). In his argument for why intellectual history is not
relevant to the ascertainment of original public meaning, Lawrence Solum briefly
mentions the possibility that historians’ work might be relevant to construction, especially
if construction includes the modality of national ethos. See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual
History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1162 (2015). I argue that history is
relevant to all of the modalities, not just ethos.
75. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 L. &
HIST. REV. 809, 812 (2019).
76. Id. at 810.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 810–11.
80. Id. at 811.
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ordinary lawyer’s work.”81 For example, “[d]eciding whether a ‘no
vehicles in the park’ ordinance forbids motorized wheelchairs
differs only in degree from reviewing warrantless GPS searches
under Founding-era trespass doctrines.” 82 Lawyers employ
standard techniques when they apply an ancient ordinance to new
factual situations not imagined at the time of its adoption: “We
would need to know the legal content of the ordinance when it
was made, the sorts of considerations that validly guided its
application at the time, and so on. These questions are the breadand-butter of ordinary legal reasoning.” 83 Thus, “[w]e do not
know what James Madison thought about video games, but we do
know how to apply general legal concepts to facts, even when the
concepts are very old and the facts are very new.”84
For the same reason, lawyers need not worry too much about
historical indeterminacy. Lawyers have the situation well in
hand—this is what they do for a living. There may be multiple
answers, but some answers are likely to be better than others from
a legal perspective. “[T]oday’s lawyers are fully capable of
rendering an opinion on which side of a Founding-era dispute had
the better claim.”85 The reason is that these are “claims of legal
interpretation, as are their negations; just as much the bread-andbutter of modern judges as ‘no vehicles in the park.’”86
Baude and Sachs seek to insulate law from historians’
methodological criticisms by arguing that no history gets in unless
law says that it does. That is, Baude and Sachs argue for the
methodological autonomy of law. Law, in this account, is a bit like
a submarine that travels blissfully through the oceans of history,
and only lets water in on its own terms. Otherwise, the submarine
would sink. Put another way, law that is fully permeable to
historical inquiry is about as useful as a screen door on a
submarine.
Baude and Sachs are correct that law uses history for its own
ends. They are also correct that how lawyers think about history
and employ history is refracted through standard forms of legal
justification. Indeed, these are the central claims of this article.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id.
Id. at 818–19.
Id. at 819 (emphasis in original).
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The difficulty is that lawyers use many different modalities of
argument, far more than Baude and Sachs let on. These
modalities of argument use history in ways that make it far more
difficult to ignore historians’ work and historians’ objections.
Because these modalities are part of legal argument, they
continually invite history—and historical criticism—inside Baude
and Sachs’ carefully constructed scheme of legal reason.
Equally important, lawyers have incentives both to construct
authority and to undermine the authority of their opponents
through the use of history. Although Baude and Sachs claim that
legal doctrines and legal methods tend to keep history out of legal
argument, the incentives of legal argument work in precisely the
opposite direction. It may well be that lawyers employ a truncated
version of history to establish authority. But lawyers on the other
side of a dispute may not let them get away with it. They will
object to how history is being used as part of their legal arguments.
Conversely, lawyers with novel claims will have incentives to
bring new historical claims, new historical sources, and new
methods of historical proof to lend authority. The recent
emergence of corpus linguistics is an example of lawyers’
perpetual quest for ever new ways to wield history to establish
their claims and discomfit their opponents.87 To the extent that
historians’ criticisms are useful to lawyers who want to criticize
other lawyers or buttress their own work, Baude and Sachs will
not be able to keep history or historians sealed off from law.
Baude and Sachs foreground only a few types of legal
argument out of many. This follows from their theory of
originalism, which asks whether today’s legal decisions have a
traceable pedigree to the law of the past and to the doctrines of
the past.88 Because of their distinctive theory of originalism, their
paradigm case of legal argument is precedental argument, which
constructs doctrines from past decisions, reasons from case to
case, and applies existing doctrines to new facts. They also advert
to textual arguments that apply familiar canons of construction.
87. See, e.g., Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second
Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (August 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org
/corpus-linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/ (“Applying corpus linguistics to the
Second Amendment leads to potentially uncomfortable criticisms for both the majority
and dissenting opinions in Heller.”).
88. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. L. REV.
1455, 1457 (2019) (“[W]hatever law [enacting the Constitution] made back then remains
the law, subject to de jure alterations or amendments made since.”).
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These modalities of argument seem very lawyerly and isolated
from much of historical inquiry. Baude and Sachs’ emphasis on
these modalities gives their argument much of its rhetorical force.
But there are plenty more arguments in constitutional law
than are dreamt of in their philosophy. When we turn to
arguments from purpose, structure, consequences, convention,
custom, ethos, tradition and honored authority, it is hard to
foreclose recourse to lots and lots of history. And not just
adoption history—all kinds of history from different times and
places. As soon as we focus on questions of purpose, or tradition,
or structure, or consequences, or custom, it is hard to make a hard
distinction between “legal doctrines and instruments” on the one
hand, and “intellectual movements” on the other.89
And even if we focus only on doctrinal argument, we cannot
seal off law from history. Doctrinal arguments can have lots of
historical tests embedded within them—for example, whether a
group has been subject to a long history of discrimination; 90
whether a certain right or interest is deeply rooted in our nation’s
history and traditions;91 or whether there is historical evidence of
a purpose or effect to promote religion.92 When forming doctrines
and applying precedents, lawyers don’t seem to be able to resist
gesturing to the past, and as soon as they do, historical inquiry
seeps in. Or to vary the metaphor, the more that lawyers try to
flee from history, the more history catches up with them.
Take Baude and Sachs’s own example: the status of
warrantless GPS searches under the Fourth Amendment. 93 In
applying new technologies to old understandings, it will not be
sufficient to parse “Founding-era trespass doctrines.” 94 We will
have to make analogies. Making analogies will require inquiries
into—among other things—purpose, institutional history,
structure and consequences. Making analogies will require what
Lawrence Lessig has called “translation.”95 It will require us to
understand the world the Framers operated in and consider how
best to realize their purposes in a very different historical context
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 810.
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 811.
Id.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS
READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019).
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with different institutional and law-enforcement structures. Or in
the words of fellow originalist Judge Robert Bork, we must
attempt “to discern how the Framers’ values, defined in the
context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.”96
As we make these inquiries, we will not be able to avoid venturing
outside of the history of doctrine; or beyond the comfortable
cocoon of common-law canons of construction. We will have to
understand “the context of the world the [Framers] knew,” and
that will invite the historians in. And even if we ourselves refuse
to venture into broader historical inquiries, we will not be able to
prevent the other lawyers we must argue with from venturing
outside.
We can put the point more generally. Lawyers use history to
make arguments through standard forms of interpretation. They
use history to give their arguments authority—many different
kinds of authority, in fact. Because lawyers use history to establish
authority, they must allow arguments about history into legal
disputes. And because they must allow arguments about history,
they must allow those who study and interpret history—that is,
historians—into these disputes as well. Chief John Roberts once
famously asserted that “history will be heard.”97 It would be quite
odd—and perhaps even a bit hypocritical—to announce that
history will be heard but not historians. It would be like saying
that one is very serious about climate change but has no interest
in hearing from any climate scientists.
All that may be so, Baude and Sachs might respond, but the
way that lawyers use these various modalities cuts off a great deal
of historical evidence and historical argument. Lawyers, unlike
historians, are simply not interested in endlessly going down
historical rabbit holes. Lawyers, unlike historians, are not
interested in endless disputation. They seek closure and decision.
They seek easily tractable questions that lawyers can answer on
their own. And once lawyers have set up the questions in ways
that lawyers believe they can answer—for example, what is the
best legal analogy between a GPS system and a common law

96. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1984).
97. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 705
(2007) (plurality opinion) (arguing that it was important to remember that the point of
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was to outlaw “using race to assign children to
schools”).
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trespass?—historians, and their annoying complications, can
(very politely) be shown the door. It was lovely talking with you
for a brief spell, dear historians, but your services are no longer
needed. We’ve got this!
But of course, lawyers are interested in endlessly going down
historical rabbit holes. And lawyers are interested in endless
disputation. This, too, is the “bread-and-butter” 98 of ordinary
legal practice. Baude and Sachs are surely correct that, when
lawyers argue, they are arguing about legal claims. They are also
correct that lawyers believe that some legal claims are more
plausible than others, and that judges make decisions about which
arguments are more plausible all the time. But it does not follow
that historical inquiry is limited in the way they suggest. Quite the
contrary, precisely because lawyers have incentives to make
whatever arguments they believe will persuasively construct legal
authority, they also have incentives to make whatever arguments
they believe will persuasively undermine the legal authority of
their opponents. Thus, if lawyers use history to establish their
authority, other lawyers will turn to history to dispute that
authority. In response, the first group of lawyers will return to
history to refute the arguments of the second group, the second
group will return to history to rebut the arguments of the first
group, a third group will intervene to say that the first two groups
have completely misunderstood the history, and so on.
Some lawyers, it is true, may want to constrict historical
inquiry and deny that historians have much to say to them. But
other lawyers, hoping to rebut them, will happily bring the
historians in. Historians do not even need to be invited—as I’ve
argued previously, the modalities of argument are always
available to them, as they are to all other citizens. Accordingly,
we should not understand Baude and Sachs’ arguments—or those
of Rappaport and Barnett—as actually setting the ground rules
for legal argument. Rather, they are particular moves within legal
argument—moves designed to structure agendas, and thereby
make a particular set of theoretical claims and approaches seem
more natural and plausible.
It is worth emphasizing this point. When a group of lawyers
say that what historians do is not relevant to law or misses the
point of legal argument, they are not simply drawing disciplinary
98.

Baude & Sachs, supra note 75, at 818.
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boundaries between law and history. They are also attempting to
set agendas, assert theoretical claims, and establish burdens of
proof within legal argument. Lawyers and legal scholars who
make these kinds of moves are not simply stiff-arming historians;
they are also setting boundaries on how other lawyers should use
history. By defining legal reason in this way, they seek to foreclose
uses of history that might undermine their particular interpretive
theories or might rebut arguments using those theories.
Attempts to fence out historians, in other words, are often
intra-disciplinary rather than cross-disciplinary: Lawyers who
hope to fence out historians may also object to lawyers who would
disagree with them about how to use history, or who would use
history in different ways to rebut their claims to legal authority.
Baude and Sachs’ picture of legal reason portrays a rough
consensus among lawyers about how to make arguments and what
sources to draw on. It is a constricted set of considerations about
which all (or almost all) well-trained lawyers agree. In fact,
the historical tools available to lawyers—and disagreements
about how to use history to persuade—are much broader than
they let on.
Baude and Sachs hold out the hope that legal doctrines and
canons of construction will limit disputation about history; that
they will tell lawyers when to stop. They imagine that there is
some constitutional law equivalent to a statute of frauds that will
rule out of bounds large swaths of historical evidence. But—
especially in constitutional law—it is quite the opposite, as anyone
who has ever picked up an amicus brief or a (very long) law review
article can tell you. Fights over constitutional doctrine do not hold
off historical dispute; they encourage lawyers to find ever new
ways to make their cases. They make historical dispute neverending.
Law claims legal authority through legal arguments. But
lawyers do not simply stop arguing. Even when things are
settled—which they often are—lawyers will continue to find new
ways to keep on arguing, and they will bring history to bear to
help them argue in new ways. And each time that lawyers bring
history to bear, either they, or their opponents, or their
opponents’ opponents, can and will enlist the work of historians.
Historians cannot be kept out of legal argument because lawyers
simply will not allow it. History is too valuable to law’s claims to
authority to banish historians.
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It is precisely because lawyers’ use of history is rhetorical—
employed to persuade in conditions of uncertainty—that lawyers
cannot really escape or seal off historical inquiry. And because
lawyers cannot escape or seal off historical inquiry, they cannot
escape or seal off those potential participants—historians—who
are professionally devoted to knowing something about history.
Lawyers cannot, as Baude and Sachs hope, limit historical inquiry,
and stop the arguments from becoming ever more about history,
or about new ways of proving (or disproving) what history shows
(or does not show). Even if, as Baude and Sachs correctly state,
law’s interest in history is limited—indeed, because it is limited—
it has a hydraulic effect. Lawyers want to establish authority, and
other lawyers want to deny them that authority. This hunger for
authority creates incentives to turn to history to construct and
deconstruct authority, to find ever new ways to make historical
claims and rebut them, to find ever new archives and methods
(such as corpus linguistics) to demonstrate and to refute historical
claims.
No doubt many historians will be horrified by what I have
just said. History, they will point out, is not simply the plaything
of adversarial legal argument. It is an inquiry into truth, even if
the conditions of that truth are uncertain and contested. What I
am describing is a perversion of the task of historical inquiry, a
task transformed and corrupted by lawyers’ desire to have the last
word in an argument for authority—a last word that, I hasten to
add, lawyers never really can have.
But the question on the table is not whether lawyers might
misuse historical methods and the work of historians—I not only
believe it, I have seen it done. Rather, the question is whether
lawyers can find ways, internal to law, to keep historians from
interrupting them and pointing out that their historical claims are
anachronistic, naive, distorted, or simply wrong. The question is
whether lawyers can successfully wield their professional identity
and their professional norms to hold off historians’ objections.
The question is whether they can pound the table, announce that
they are lawyers, and tell the historians to just shut up because,
frankly, it’s none of their business.
My point is that lawyers cannot successfully do this, and the
reason they cannot do this is because of their very professional
identity as lawyers and their own professional norms. The very
features of professionalism that cause lawyers to distort history
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also open the door to history and historical criticism. As long as
lawyers want to find ways of persuading others, and as long as they
want to rebut the arguments of their fellow lawyers, they will find
all sorts of history, and all sorts of historians, indispensable to
their task. The relevance of history—and therefore historical
dispute—is baked into the modalities of argument that lawyers
unself-consciously employ. This does not make lawyers good
historians—it only makes them perpetually subject to historians’
interventions.
Baude and Sachs, like Rappaport and Barnett, are simply the
latest in a long line of defenders of law’s methodological
autonomy, the latest constructors of a Maginot line that hopes to
let in only a controlled dose of history and keep the rest—and
those pesky historians—out. The drawing of metes and bounds is
not inappropriate by itself—it is part of what it means for a
profession to be a profession. At the same time, for reasons
internal to this particular profession, each attempt to
simultaneously use history to establish legal authority and to
exclude historical critiques from historians will fail. It will fail not
because lawyers lack distinctive professional identities and
professional training but because of their distinctive professional
identities and their professional training. Because lawyers are
lawyers, they will continually alternate between pushing away and
embracing forms of expertise that might assist them in building up
or chipping away at claims of legal authority. The problem is not
that the historians won’t shut up; it is that the lawyers won’t shut
up. Lawyers will always try to find new ways to establish the
authority of their positions and undermine the authority of their
competitors’ claims. Lawyers, because they are lawyers, simply
cannot help themselves.
VI. THE NEED FOR A USABLE PAST
The second standard way that lawyers attempt to deflect
criticisms from historians is to argue that lawyers, because they
are practical people of the world, need a useable past. The
expression “a usable past” was coined in a 1918 essay, “On
Creating a Usable Past,” by the American literary critic Van
Wyck Brooks.99 Brooks was one of the “Young Americans,” who
99. Van Wyck Brooks, On Creating a Usable Past, 64 DIAL 337 (1918),
http://www.archive.org/stream/dialjournallitcrit64chicrich#page/337/mode/1up.
Many
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offered cultural criticisms of the United States in the early
twentieth century.100 Many people have subsequently spoken of a
“usable past” without mentioning Brooks, while uncannily
replicating some of the themes of his essay. And of course,
although Brooks coined the term “usable past,” the idea that
people should deliberately use the memory of the past to inspire
great work in the present long precedes him. To give only one
example, this is one of the themes of Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous
1874 essay, “On the Use and Abuse of History for the Present.”101
Brooks’s concern was not authority in constitutional
interpretation, but greatness in American letters. The problem, as
Brooks saw it, was how to create a national culture in the United
States that could inspire greatness in American writers and
promote finer attitudes and better ideals. Unfortunately, Brooks
believed, American culture at the beginning of the twentieth
century was a “travesty of a civilization.”102 It was materialistic
and stupid; it blindly worshiped wealth and technological
progress. Professors of literature and history in universities were
of little use. They celebrated the great deeds of America’s past,
but only used this knowledge to shame young people rather than
inspire them; moreover, academics were no less compromised by
the technology-worship and materialism of the age.103
Brooks contrasted America with Europe. Europe, he
believed, had a past that inspired and encouraged great art. (This
assertion is somewhat ironic, of course, given the currents of
artistic modernism then working their way through Europe.)
Americans lacked a cultural memory that grounded their efforts,
situated their art, and offered an artistic tradition to work with or
against.
How could Americans use their past to enrich their culture?
The answer, Brooks argued, was that Americans should invent

people now associate the phrase with the work of Henry Steele Commager and Herbert
Muller. See HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE SEARCH FOR A USABLE PAST AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 3–27 (1967); HERBERT J. MULLER, THE USES OF THE PAST:
PROFILES OF FORMER SOCIETIES (1967).
100. On the Young Americans, see CASEY NELSON BLAKE, BELOVED COMMUNITY:
THE CULTURAL CRITICISM OF RANDOLPH BOURNE, VAN WYCK BROOKS, WALDO
FRANK, & LEWIS MUMFORD (1990).
101. FRIEDERICH NIETZSCHE, On the Use and Abuse of History for the Present, in
UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (Daniel Breazeale ed., R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1997).
102. Brooks, supra note 99, at 339.
103. Id. at 337–38.
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the kind of past that they could use. 104 They should draw on
elements of the past and reinterpret them into a worthy tradition
that could inspire them: “The past is an inexhaustible storehouse
of apt attitudes and adaptable ideals; it opens of itself at the touch
of desire; it yields up, now this treasure, now that, to anyone who
comes to it armed with a capacity for personal choices.”105
In Brooks’ account, a usable past is a selective history; it does
not revel in needless complications or complexities. It does not
require a comprehensive record of history. It wants just enough
history to do its job—which is to inspire the present. Nor is a
usable past a foreign country or an alien realm. Advocates of a
usable past are not interested in the inherent pastness of the past,
but in its organic relationship to the present. A usable past is a
past that is connected to us, not separated from us. A usable past
is a past that we can understand and relate to, a past that is not
hopelessly different from our own world. Above all, a usable past
is a resource that people in the present can deploy selectively to
support and inspire fellow citizens to great deeds and great works
of art. Brooks uses the metaphor of a “storehouse” of objects that
one might choose from, while leaving the others behind. The
riches of this storehouse emerge from “desire” and “personal
choice.” It contains “apt” features that we can take with us to the
present, and ideals that are “adaptable” to our needs. And above
all the storehouse is valuable to us because it can revitalize and
motivate the present and spur great cultural achievements.
Brooks’ fellow Young American, Lewis Mumford,
emphasized that a usable past gave meaning to our endeavors by
connecting us to the past. A culture needs continuity with the past
to ground itself and give itself direction. Because America lacked
a usable past, Mumford believed, it was prey to the social forces
of the present, including social disconnection and unchecked
materialism: “Establishing its own special relations with its past,
each generation creates anew what lies behind it, as well as what
looms in front; and instead of being victimized by those forces
104. Id. at 339 (“[T]he American writer floats in [a] void because the past that survives
in the common mind of the present is a past without living value. But is this the only
possible past? If we need another past so badly, is it inconceivable that we might discover
one, that we might even invent one? Discover, invent a usable past we certainly can, and
that is what a vital criticism always does.”).
105. Id.; see also id. at 340 (“What is important for us? What, out of all the multifarious
achievements and impulses and desires of the American literary mind, ought we elect to
remember?”).
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which are uppermost at the moment, it gains the ability to select
the qualities which it values, and by exercising them it rectifies its
own infirmities and weaknesses.”106
A usable past is a form of cultural memory and tradition, and
Brooks viewed cultural memory and tradition as constructed,
either by accident or by design. Cultural memory is made up of
what people in a society choose to remember about their past.
Tradition is made up out of what they choose to honor. Brooks
pointed out, for example, that other nations found plenty of things
in the American experience to celebrate—and each nation found
different things to admire because they saw things in America that
resonated or contrasted with the cultural memory and traditions
of their own countries.107
It followed then, that Americans should create their own
memories and traditions that could inspire them by mining the
storehouse of the past to find what was useful for the present, and
to elevate it even if it had not been previously been deemed
important. To this end, Brooks argued against focusing on the
relatively small number of celebrated American authors and
acknowledged masterpieces of American literature.108 Instead, to
create a useable past Americans should focus on the strivings of
eccentrics and failures—now mostly forgotten—whose creativity
and genius had been unfairly stunted by the national culture that
surrounded them. Inspiration for great work in the future would
come from rediscovering and elevating this “limbo of the nonelect.”109 American artists should select from the past according
to their values, and find their heroes, even among the forgotten
and cast-off elements of history.
Some eighty years later, in 1995, the American legal scholar
Cass Sunstein wrote a short essay in the Columbia Law Review
entitled “The Idea of a Usable Past.”110 His goal was to explain
why constitutional lawyers could and should use history
differently than professional historians. He offered virtually all of
the standard arguments that lawyers make in their defense, and
his article remains the best and most sustained argument for a
106. BLAKE, supra note 100, at 296–97 (quoting Lewis Mumford, The Emergence of a
Past, 45 NEW REPUBLIC 19 (1925)).
107. Brooks, supra note 99, at 339–40.
108. Id. at 341.
109. Id. at 340.
110. Sunstein, supra note 23.

BALKIN 35:3

2020]

12/29/2020 11:19 PM

LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS

387

“usable past” in the law review literature. Although Sunstein did
not mention Brooks, his account has striking similarities.
Sunstein wrote to respond to criticisms—by both lawyers and
historians—directed at the “republican revival” in American legal
scholarship in the 1980s. Almost contemporaneous with the
promotion of conservative originalism by the Reagan
Administration and the Federalist Society, liberal academics like
Sunstein and Frank Michelman had begun to offer a left-liberal
version of originalism, grounding a progressive constitutionalism
in a distinctive account of the Founding. 111 They drew on
historical work by Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and J. G. A.
Pocock, among others.112
Sunstein and Michelman argued that the true tradition of
American constitutionalism was not exclusively Lockean liberal
individualism, which generations of scholars had used to justify a
focus on individual rights and interest group pluralism. Rather,
the Founding generation was also steeped in the ideology of civic
republicanism, which emphasized civic virtue, social connection,
deliberative democracy, and the common good. By forgetting
these traditions of civic republicanism, American legal scholars
had cut themselves off from their own history, and adopted a false
narrative that legitimated a politics of selfishness and self-interest.
The republican revival, as it was called, generated rebuttals
from historians and from legal scholars who specialized in
Founding-era history. Critics charged that neo-republicans were
engaged in a more sophisticated version of the law-office history
of conservative originalists. As Laura Kalman put it, the neorepublicans rummaged through the past “to find arguments for
whatever vision of the social order they wished to promote. By
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988);
Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985). Civic republican themes were also combined with feminism and critical legal
studies. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
112. See JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE
REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790S (1984); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776–87 (1969).
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mooring their vision in the Founding, law professors believed they
could make a more powerful case for it. They could claim kinship
with the Founders.”113
To be sure, there were a few differences between the neorepublicans and conservative originalists. First, most professional
historians, who were liberals themselves, tended to sympathize
with the political project of the neo-republicans. Second, the neorepublicans drew on a wider range of sources and secondary
literature than conservative originalists, including the work of the
most distinguished professional historians. “[T]he civic
republicans,” Mark Festa explained, “sought to invoke the
authority not just of historical evidence itself, but also of the
professional expertise of the historians who interpreted it.”114
But these differences hardly absolved the liberal law
professors in the eyes of professional historians. If anything, they
made historians uneasy. It was one thing to see conservatives
quoting Blackstone or The Federalist anachronistically and out of
context. It was quite another to see the best historical scholarship
deployed in this way.115
Historians like Gordon Wood and Joyce Appleby pointed
out that neo-republicans could not find the historical pedigree
they sought by appealing to the ideology of civic republicanism.116
Linda Kerber noted that the civic republicanism of the Founders
was not easy to separate from militarism, patriarchy and
oligarchy, and that it was anachronistic to try to separate them.117
Law professors, who are often the sternest critics of other law
professors doing history, were more blunt. Mark Tushnet worried
that the ideology of eighteenth century civic republicanism
“unravels once we attempt to disentangle the currently attractive
strands from the currently unattractive ones.” 118 H. Jefferson
Powell argued that there was little connection between Sunstein’s
political ideals and “specific schools of thought in the founding
113.
114.
115.
116.

LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 175 (1996).
Festa, supra note 7, at 495–96.
Id.
KALMAN, supra note 113, at 175–76 (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC viii (1969)).
117. Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1667–69
(1988).
118. Mark Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional Historiography, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 96 (1987); see also Hendrik Hartog, Imposing Constitutional
Traditions, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81–82 (1987).
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era.”119 Barry Friedman argued that “[t]he very same problems
that haunt originalism also haunt republicanism.” 120 Martin
Flaherty dubbed the republican revival “History Lite.”121
In response, Sunstein defended his use of civic republicanism
on the grounds that constitutional lawyers need a usable past,
which he defined as “finding elements in history that can be
brought fruitfully to bear on current problems.” 122 In fact,
Sunstein, argued “[t]he search for a useable past is a defining
feature of the constitutional lawyer’s approach to constitutional
history.”123
Invoking Ronald Dworkin’s idea of constructive
interpretation, which tries to make the materials of the law “the
best they can be,” 124 Sunstein asserted that “constitutional
lawyers, unlike ordinary historians, should attempt to make the
best constructive sense out of historical events associated with the
Constitution.” 125 Consistent with the “fit” of historical facts,
lawyers should “try to conceive of the materials in a way that
makes political or moral sense, rather than nonsense, out of them
to current generations.”126 Obviously this meant viewing history
in the light of the present-day lawyer’s moral and political
judgments. “Everyone can see that the political or moral
commitments of the constitutional lawyer are an omnipresent part
of the constitutional lawyer’s constitutional history.” But this is
not an embarrassment. “Political or moral commitments play a
role because of the interpretive nature of the lawyer’s enterprise,
which involves showing how the history might be put to present
use.”127
Sunstein denied that there was anything illegitimate about
“identify[ing] those features of the constitutional past” that a
119. H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1706, 1711
(1988).
120. Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 928, 945 (1997)
(reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)).
121. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
122. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603; cf. Brooks, supra note 99, at 340 (“Only by the
exercise of a little pragmatism . . . can the past experience of our people be placed at the
service of the future”).
123. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603.
124. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE vii, 52–55, 62, 77, 229 (1986).
125. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 602 (emphasis in original).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 603.
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lawyer views as “especially suitable for present constitutional
use.”128 “Constitutional law is based on ideas about authority, not
just on ideas about the good or the right.”129 And “[t]he American
constitutional culture gives special weight to the conventions of
those who ratified constitutional provisions.”130
Sunstein’s model of a useable past was primarily concerned
with adoption history. But not all of adoption history—much less
all of American history—can form part of a useable past, Sunstein
explained. “[M]uch in our constitutional history is bad and no
longer usable.”131 For example, the Founders accepted slavery, a
“much narrower” conception of freedom of speech “than anyone
would find reasonable today,” and “the Framers’ conception of
equality would permit forms of discrimination that the Supreme
Court would unanimously condemn” today. 132 Sunstein did not
deny that these events happened. His point was that they were not
useful to constitutional lawyers who sought to create a useable
past: “[a]spects of constitutional history that are of considerable
importance to constitutional historians may not be so useful for
constitutional lawyers.”133
“[T]he constitutional lawyer, thinking about the future
course of constitutional law, has a special project” that
distinguishes her from the professional historian. 134 The
professional historian is “subject to the discipline provided by the
sources and by the interpretive conventions in the relevant
communities of historians.” 135 But “the constitutional lawyer is
trying to contribute to the legal culture’s repertoire of arguments
and political/legal narratives that place a (stylized) past and
present into a trajectory leading to a desired future.” 136 The
professional historian may have her eyes on the past, but the
constitutional lawyer has her eyes on the future. She wants to
forge a rhetorical connection between the admirable features of
the Founders’ vision and the political world she would like to
bring into being. Because the Founders are central to our
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
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constitutional heritage, they can encourage, authorize, and inspire
our efforts in the present.
Two features make the past usable. First, the past
“discipline[es] legal judgment.” It bounds utopian speculation
and connects legal argument to the American constitutional
tradition. It requires lawyers to argue in terms of materials that
have “at least some kind of democratic pedigree” because they
were adopted by We the People.137
Second, and equally important, what makes the past usable
is that it is normatively admirable by today’s standards.
Conversely, what is not normatively acceptable is not usable. As
Sunstein put it, “much in our constitutional history is bad and no
longer usable.” 138 Again contrasting the interests of lawyers to
those of historians, he explained, “[p]erhaps the historian wants
to reveal the closest thing to a full picture of the past, or to stress
the worst aspects of a culture’s legal tradition,” but “constitutional
history as set out by the constitutional lawyer, as a participant in
the constitutional culture, usually tries to put things in a favorable
or appealing light without, however, distorting what can actually
be found.”139
Sunstein believed that the civic republican tradition offered
an excellent example of how present-day lawyers could interpret
the past constructively—that is, admirably—by abstracting away
its normatively unacceptable features. The tradition of civic
republicanism was built on social hierarchy. Male citizens could
be devoted to the public good because they were heads of
households. They were supported by women and (sometimes)
slaves, who were regarded as properly subordinate to a
community of equal male citizens. Civic duty was connected
obligations of militia service, including the willingness to fight and
die for the republic; thus, the idea of civic virtue had overtones of
militarism and manly virtue.
Sunstein was perfectly aware of all this but argued that it did
not matter. The republican tradition, “in some of its
incarnations,” was “associated with unappealing and unusable
ideas—exclusion of women, militarism, lack of respect for

137. Id. at 604.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 603.
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competing conceptions of the good, and more.” 140 (Note, once
again, that what makes these ideas “unusable” is that they are
wrong by today’s standards.) “But the commitment to
deliberative democracy is not logically connected with those
unappealing ideals; indeed, as an abstraction it is in considerable
tension with them.”141 Abstracting away the unjust elements of a
tradition is acceptable, Sunstein argued, and may even be
necessary to render it usable to the present. “Constitutional
lawyers who are interested in republicanism need not be
embarrassed by its contingent historical connection with unjust
practices.”142
Despite the disciplinary differences between law and
literature, Sunstein’s account of a usable past is remarkably
similar to Brooks’ version in 1918. Americans need inspiration to
achieve great things, whether in politics, law or in letters. To do
that they need a past that is useful for this purpose. Academic
historians, with their eyes fixed on the past, reined in by their own
professional norms, are often mired in antiquarian projects, and
can offer only limited assistance. Academic historians are far
more likely to complicate than to elucidate, to depress and
confuse their audiences than to inspire them to great things.
American lawyers, like American literary critics, understand that
the point of the past is to serve the future. Accordingly, they need
to reach into the storehouse of history, construct inspiring
narratives, and create a past worthy of instruction to the present.
Just as Mumford believed that establishing connections with
history could help us from being “victimized by those forces which
are uppermost at the moment,”143 Sunstein argued that retelling
the story of civic republicanism could help constitutional lawyers
combat the selfishness of 1980s politics. In this way progressive
lawyers could counter the neo-liberal agenda of the Reagan
years—itself
defended
in
originalist
terms—with
a
communitarian vision drawn from the Founding.
In terms of the modalities of historical argument described in
Part II of this article, it is easy to see that Sunstein’s version of a
usable past is an appeal to ethos, tradition, and honored authority.
140. Id. at 606.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. BLAKE, supra note 100, at 297 (quoting Lewis Mumford, The Emergence of a
Past, 45 NEW REPUBLIC 19 (1925)).
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His arguments about civic republicanism appeal to the same
modalities of ethos, tradition and honored authority as many
conservative originalist arguments do—either implicitly or
explicitly. 144 That is why, I suspect, professional historians may
have reacted in the way that they did.
Sunstein, however, was insistent that he was not
countenancing bad history, much less advocating sloppiness: “[I]t
is familiar to find a constitutional lawyer reading history at a very
high level of abstraction (“the Framers were committed to
freedom of speech”) and concluding that some concrete outcome
follows for us (“laws regulating obscenity are unconstitutional.”)
This use of history is not honorable.”145 The problem for Sunstein
was that pointing to the level of abstraction did not really
distinguish how he wanted to use history from the kind of
historical arguments he did not respect. To create his version of a
usable past, Sunstein also wanted to read history at a fairly high
level of abstraction; and, as we have seen, he believed that one
could abstract away the unpalatable parts of the civic republican
tradition.
“The Framers,” Sunstein explained, “were republicans. . . .
[T]hey prized civic virtue and sought to promote deliberation in
government—deliberation oriented toward rights answers about
the collective good.” 146 Sunstein sought to apply these abstract
propositions to modern First Amendment law and other doctrinal
areas. His 1993 book Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,
for example, was premised on a “Madisonian” conception of free
speech which purportedly reflected the Founding-era ideals of
deliberative democracy. 147 Reviewing Sunstein’s book, I joked
that “Sunstein’s ‘Madisonian’ theory of the First Amendment is
about as Madisonian as Madison, Wisconsin: It is a tribute to a
great man and his achievements, but bears only a limited
connection to his actual views.”148

144. See Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 652, 682–96 (arguing that
originalist arguments involve multiple modalities and usually implicitly or explicitly appeal
to ethos, tradition, and honored authority).
145. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 603.
146. Id. at 605.
147. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xvi–
xviii, 132–33, 241–44 (1993).
148. J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1955 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH (1993)).
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What distinguishes good from bad uses of history, however,
is not the level of abstraction. It is whether we acknowledge or
disguise our modality of argument. Bad uses of history mislead
their audiences about the kinds of justification they actually
employ. For example, they might assert that they are only
concerned with discerning the historical facts of meaning, purpose
or intention when they are actually appealing to (and
reconstructing) ethos and tradition, using the Framers and the
Founding generation as culture heroes.149 Perhaps what Sunstein
should have said was that while those who misused history refused
to admit this, he would do so forthrightly. He was acting as what
I call a “memory entrepreneur,” seeking to construct inspiring
narratives of the past to articulate a desirable conception of
American values in the present.150
In hindsight, then, it would probably have been better for
Sunstein to avoid making his first amendment theory sound like
conservative originalism, much less to assert that his theory of
freedom of speech was Madison’s theory, or that it had “firm
support” from Founding-era history.151 Instead, he might simply
have emphasized that, like Justice Brandeis in Whitney v.
California, he was making an argument about national ethos.152
The American tradition of freedom of expression, understood in
its best light, and symbolized by Madison, the First Amendment’s
author, is a tradition that celebrates reason and deliberation to
make democracy work. Put in terms of Sunstein’s arguments
about a useful past, he was “contribut[ing] to the legal culture’s
repertoire of arguments and political/legal narratives that place a
(stylized) past and present into a trajectory leading to a desired
future.”153 This might have robbed his arguments of the historical
pedigree that originalist scholars sometimes like to claim for
themselves. But it would have offered a more appropriate use of
history.
Sunstein’s account of a usable past is quite common among
149. Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at 641, 652, 682–96.
150. Id. at 696.
151. SUNSTEIN, supra note 147, at 132.
152. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373–74 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (1927)
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”); Balkin, The New Originalism, supra note 28, at
676–77.
153. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 605.
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American constitutional lawyers, even if they have not always
expressed their aims so coherently and candidly. 154 American
lawyers are not interested in antiquarianism for its own sake.
They want to draw lessons, advice, and even commands from
history. To this end, they seek a past that can justify
interpretations of the Constitution in the present. They look for
those features of the American constitutional tradition that, given
their political and theoretical commitments, deserve to be
continued and followed today. This is an example of what I earlier
called an obedient use of history. We might call this model of a
usable past the model of admirable ancestors. By the standards of
this model only some history is usable. The rest is not.
Understood as a justification for making arguments from
ethos, tradition, and honored authority—the model of admirable
ancestors is a perfectly legitimate use of history. Legitimate, that
is, if it does not try to conceal its nature to its audience.
Nevertheless, as a general account of a usable past for
constitutional argument, this model has very significant
limitations.
First, the model of admirable ancestors is usually concerned
with adoption history, and especially the history of the Founding.
All other history of the nation, and indeed, of the world, is, by
implication, not usable for these purposes. Similarly, it is a history
of persons and groups who successfully managed to change the
text of the Constitution or to influence those who did. Thus,
Locke and Blackstone are part of a usable past because the
adopters read them and were influenced by them. The AntiFederalists are part of a usable past because their objections to

154. For example, Alexander Bickel anticipates many of Sunstein’s arguments. See,
e.g., BICKEL, supra note 25, at 109 (quoting Herbert Muller for the view that “[o]ur task is
to create a ‘usable past,’ for our own living purposes”); id. (quoting Jacob Burckhardt for
the view that history “is on every occasion the record of what one age finds worthy of note
in another”); id. (“We are guided in our search of the past by our own aspirations and
evolving principles, which were in part formed by that very past.”); id. at 109–10 (arguing
that “[w]hen we find in history . . . principles that we can adopt or adapt, or ideals and
aspirations that speak with contemporary relevance,” we should focus on “the rhetorical
tradition and its implications, not the inconsistent commitment.”).
Like me, Howard Vogel connects the idea of a usable past in constitutional law to the
forms of argument. See Howard J. Vogel, The “Ordered Liberty” of Substantive Due
Process and the Future of Constitutional Law as a Rhetorical Art: Variations on a Theme
from Justice Cardozo in the United States Supreme Court, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1473, 1545–52
(2007) (“[L]egal argument is always, in various ways, a search for a ‘usable past’ in light of
the need to resolve disputes in the present”).
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the proposed Constitution forced its advocates to modify their
claims about how the Constitution would operate in practice, and
to support new amendments to the Constitution, some of which
appeared in the Bill of Rights. Likewise, the views of nineteenthcentury abolitionists are part of a usable past because their
opposition to slavery eventually carried the day in the
Reconstruction Amendments. In sum, this account of a usable
past focuses on the history of those who won struggles for
constitutional adoption—or influenced those who won—as
opposed to those whose claims were ignored or crushed; or those
who, like women before the adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment, were given no voice in governance. 155 (We might
contrast this model of a usable past to that of Van Wyck Brooks,
who sought to construct a tradition from those who lost so badly
that they are not even remembered.) Selecting only the winners’
perspectives discards a great deal of history as not usable.
Second, what makes the past usable in this model is that it is
normatively admirable by today’s standards—or at the very least
acceptable and inoffensive. (More precisely, it is admirable in the
eyes of the particular person making the historical argument.)
Conversely, what is not normatively admirable or acceptable is
not usable; therefore it must be omitted, distinguished, or
separated from the honorable and usable parts of history.
History is usable in this model because it teaches us
something important about the past that we should follow in the
present. We might follow it because it provides an authoritative
construction of features of the Constitution, its purposes, text, and
structure. Or we might follow it because it offers us models for
appropriate behavior or principles for present-day law and
politics. But in either case, a usable past gives us guidance about
what to do today, either through instruction or inspiration. Thus,
in terms of Part III’s typology, the model of admirable ancestors
is both an obedient and an authority-constructing use of history.156
Nevertheless, this conception of a usable past throws away a
great deal of history; and it discards many possible ways of using
a complex tradition in the present.157 History that shows that our
155. Siegel, supra note 40.
156. See supra Part III.
157. See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115,
2153 (1999) (“Sunstein does not come to grips with the reality that all of American history
is potentially relevant to his project.”).
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constitutional traditions are not worthy, admirable, or inspiring is
not usable. History that shows how application of past practices
to present-day circumstances is inevitably anachronistic is not
usable. History that complicates—that denies that we have
inherited a coherent or unitary tradition—is not usable. Similarly,
history that shows that there was not a clear, definitive answer to
how the Constitution was understood at the time of adoption, is
not usable. Critical accounts of history, which show how our
present traditions, values, and arrangements are inextricably
bound up with past errors and injustices, are not usable.
Historicist accounts, which show how features of the
constitutional tradition—and our understanding of those
features—have not been constant or enduring but have altered
with changing times, are not usable.
The irony of this model of a usable past is that it renders so
much history unusable.
It is a bit like a man who enters a huge room with a vast
variety of fresh ingredients, meats, fruits, vegetables, condiments
and spices before him. He then proceeds to throw away almost
everything in the room and make a grilled-cheese sandwich. He
defends his wastefulness on the grounds that he is not a
professional chef—he is a special kind of short-order cook. From
his perspective, all of the other food in the room is simply
unusable. And besides, he explains earnestly, the customers won’t
swallow anything else.
I myself have nothing against a really good grilled-cheese
sandwich. But surely there is more nourishment to be found in
history.
For history to be usable, it does not have to offer a clear
command to the present. It does not have to be honorable or
inspiring. The past is a motley arrangement of good and bad, just
and unjust, often inextricably bound together. Negative
precedents may be more valuable to us than hero worship.
Knowing how the nation went wrong may be more useful than
hearing yet again how splendidly our predecessors got things
right. History may edify even if it does not inspire.
This point holds true even if we limit ourselves to arguments
from ethos and tradition. In 1995, Sunstein hoped to abstract the
tradition of civic republicanism from its unpalatable historical
elements. These unjust elements, he thought, were merely
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“contingent.” 158 But what if they were not? Suppose that the
social hierarchy of the eighteenth century helped make civic
republicanism possible? Then it would be partly constitutive of
the tradition and not merely contingent. If we want to follow that
tradition today, we may have to take the bitter with the sweet. Or
we may have to change the tradition significantly, in which case
we are not following it so much as transforming it.
Political traditions are entangled in complex social relations
and historical contexts. Transporting these values from the past
may bring other less admirable features and complications along
with them. If we assume that we can easily cleanse these traditions
of their less troublesome elements, we may miss some of the most
important lessons of the past for the present. Working within a
tradition, no matter how hallowed, may involve moral
compromises. There are no traditions without tradeoffs.
Instead of trying to abstract away the problems of past
traditions, it may be more appropriate to acknowledge their
difficulties and complications. The past may be more usable if we
do not treat our traditions as unequivocally admirable; it will
simply be usable in a different way. 159 History has many uses
besides imitation, obedience, or encouragement. It may edify,
enlighten or admonish us. We might use the past to make the
present strange to us, thereby loosening us from our accustomed
habits of thinking, and our constant tendency to accept the world
before us as just and natural; or, conversely, as incorrigible and
impossible to reform.
History may reveal problems never solved and injustices
never corrected whose consequences haunt us today. It may show
the residue of ancient wrongs in a modern world. It may remind us
not to paper over past difficulties with the banner of a glorious and
unitary tradition. History might suggest alternatives to our present
arrangements, or offer warnings about disasters we should avoid.
Instead of directing our course of action, it may clarify our choices.
Instead of urging us to imitate our ancestors, it may remind us how
much our actions must be our own responsibility.
158. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 606.
159. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s
“Strange Career” and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1084
(1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM
(1996)) (arguing for employing the civic republican tradition in all its interpretive
complexity and normative ambiguity).
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VII. CONCLUSION: ADMIRABLE ANCESTORS OR
MULTIPLE MODALITIES
To imagine a better model of a usable past for constitutional
lawyers, begin with a different set of questions: What do lawyers
want from the past, and what makes it useful to them? By this
point in the Article, the answer should be obvious. Lawyers want
to use the past to help them make arguments that (1) successfully
claim legal authority and (2) rebut claims to authority offered by
their opponents.
It follows that a usable past might include any part of the past
that might assist lawyers in the construction or the deconstruction
of legal authority. The past is potentially usable whenever it
assists lawyers in making or rebutting arguments according to the
eleven modalities of constitutional argument. We might call this
conception of a usable past the model of multiple modalities.
The model of admirable ancestors is only a special case of this
model because it limits itself to certain arguments from ethos,
tradition, and honored authority. The model of multiple
modalities encompasses all of the history relevant to the model of
admirable ancestors. But it includes far more history, and values
it for a much wider range of purposes.
To be sure, this account of a usable past is still selective. Not
every part of the past is equally useful to the modalities of legal
argument, even considered collectively. The model of multiple
modalities is not a neutral or dispassionate inquiry into history,
because of the close connections between usable history and
theories of legal justification. Above all, this model of a usable
past is shaped by lawyers’ concerns. It is an adversarial conception
of history shaped by the needs of the legal profession—the need
to create new arguments for new situations and to rebut the
arguments of one’s opponents. It differs from how other parts of
the humanities and social sciences may think of the past; and
historians may still criticize how lawyers use history for this
reason.
Nevertheless, this conception of a usable past has definite
advantages over the model of admirable ancestors.
First, it employs a far broader set of historical materials than
adoption history. It ranges over the whole of American history,
and indeed, the history of the world.
Second, it is not limited to appeals to ethos, tradition, and
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honored authority. History may be useful to assess consequences,
to understand the structures of a well-functioning government,
and to reckon with the meaning of events quite distant from the
Founding.
Third, this model does not require that history be admirable,
uncomplicated, or univocal in order to be useful, especially when
the advocate’s task is criticism or rebuttal. It does not rule out
complexity or shun a critical approach. It does not require that
history be inspiring or that we must always place our traditions in
their best light. And it does not assume that in searching for a
usable past, we may excise what is unjust or uncomfortable,
especially if we can learn from it.
Finally, the model of multiple modalities is a better account
of a usable past because it better integrates the contributions of
historians. It does not assume that professional historians cannot
usefully critique lawyers’ history because lawyers inhabit different
professional roles and are engaged in different intellectual
projects.
I have no quarrel with the notion of a usable past. But
constitutional lawyers have not taken the idea seriously enough—
or considered all of its ramifications. Even if we restrict ourselves
to the lawyer’s obsessive focus on constructing and deconstructing
legal authority, there are many ways to use history; and many
different kinds of history, from all times and places, that one might
employ. Critical uses of history, which show the limits and failings
of the past, may be every bit as useful as heroic accounts.
Complicating uses of history, which reveal dissensus, ambiguity
and contingency, may be as important to understanding the
present as stylized accounts that seek a single, univocal, lesson or
command.
If we want a usable past, we should not be wasteful. We
should be willing to use as much of the past as possible, and for as
many purposes as we can. If we are economical with history, and
remember the multiple ways to employ and learn from it, it will
provide us with all the riches we could desire.

